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To the conscience of the nation that fancies itself the
world's greatest democracy, the idea of military intrusion into
the affairs of civil government is profoundly repugnant. In 1972,
for example, the United States Supreme Court, through Chief
Justice Burger, had occasion to recall "the traditional and strong
resistance of Americans to any military intrusion into civilian
affairs. That tradition has deep roots in our history . "... 1
Again in 1974, the same Chief Justice observed on behalf of the
Court that even where some form of government force is war-
ranted, "the decision to invoke military power has traditionally
been viewed with suspicion and skepticism since it often
involves the temporary suspension of some of our most cher-
ished rights-government by elected civilian leaders, freedom of
expression, of assembly and association."2 The case in which the
latter statement was made involved the use of state military
forces to disperse a crowd and execute state law. This article is
not concerned with state military forces; its concern is with the
national armed forces of the United States. However, the tradi-
tion, and indeed the law, recalled by Chief Justice Burger is
even more clearly "suspicious" and "resistant" with regard to
intrusions of the national military than with regard to the mod-
est military establishments of the states.
Military intervention can take many forms. It would be an
unwarranted extravagance to suggest that the United States
* This article will also appear as part of a symposium, MILITARY INTERVENTION IN
DEMOCEATIC Sociuams: LAW POLICY AND PRACTICE IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES, edited by P. Rowe and C. J. Whelan to be published in late 1984 by Croom
Helm.
** Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law. LL.B., 1964, Univer-
sity of Kansas; S.J.D., 1969, University of Michigan.
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2. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 246 (1974).
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stands in risk of a military coup d'etat. It would also be extreme
to suggest that any widespread imposition of military govern-
ment, even at the instance of legitimate civilian officials them-
selves, is probable today. The point of conscience-and of
law-which Chief Justice Burger's comments address, however,
most significantly pertains to forms of military intervention far
short of forceful or invited military takeover.
The execution, or enforcement, of civilian laws by military
troops, which often but not exclusively is associated with riots
and other civil disorders, is another form of military interven-
tion into civilian affairs. With regard to such intervention, Chief
Justice Burger's statements actually understate the force of tra-
dition and conscience embodied in American law. The Chief Jus-
tice noted that such "law enforcement" use of military power
often "involves" the "suspension" of cherished rights. The more
accurate proposition is that military enforcement of civilian law
is itself a displacement or "suspension" of civilian process,
impermissible per se even apart from any further consequences
it might entail.
More than a century ago, in Ex parte Milligan,' the
Supreme Court without dissent rejected the contention that the
national military could be used as an alternative to civilian mea-
sures and procedures to enforce the law even in times of stress.
The Court acknowledged that where civilian authority has actu-
ally been overthrown-the civil administration deposed, and the
civil courts closed-actual and present necessity compels reli-
ance upon the military until civil authority is restored.4 In such
circumstances, however, it is some hostile force that has accom-
plished the displacement of civilian authority. There is abso-
lutely no lawful power in any branch of the government itself to
supersede ordinary civilian authority or suspend any safeguard
of the Constitution (except that the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus can be suspended as the Constitution itself
prescribes).5
3. 71 U.S. (4 Wal.) 2 (1866).
4. Id. at 127.
5. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 125. The
opinion of the Court was written by Justice Davis and joined by four other Justices. The
Chief Justice wrote a concurring opinion, joined by the remaining three Justices, which
would countenance resort to military action "where ordinary law no longer adequately
secures public safety and private rights," but only "in times of insurrection or invasion,
or of civil or foreign war," and even then only when authorized by Congress, "or tempo-
rarily, when the action of Congress cannot be invited, and in the case of justifying and
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Although the facts of the Milligan case involved an individ-
ual who had been not only sought out, seized, and confined by
soldiers, but also thereafter convicted and sentenced by a mili-
tary tribunal, the principle proclaimed by the Supreme Court
pertains not only to military trial and punishment but equally to
military measures of law enforcement short of trial. During the
Civil War period, Union troops had been employed on countless
occasions in the loyal Northern states, superseding regular civil-
ian officials to suppress civil disorders arising from opposition to
the military draft and protests against arrests of deserters.
Soldiers also went about seizing and confining Northern civilians
suspected of supporting the Confederacy. Thousands were
detained, and many of those were never brought even to a mili-
tary trial. All this was done under the claimed authority of the
President as Commander-in-Chief, relying upon an opinion writ-
ten in 1861 by United States Attorney General Bates. The
Attorney General had opined that, given the existence of an
insurrection in the South, the President enjoyed discretionary
power to use the armed forces even in the North to do all he felt
necessary to execute federal laws there, regardless of whether
any civilians apprehended be brought before some tribunal or
merely held indefinitely without trial. Bates thought it suffi-
cient, to answer the argument that such law enforcement action
by the military amounted to a suspension of civil law and rights,
to recite that the President-a civilian-was Commander-in-
Chief; he reasoned that this was enough to constitute satisfac-
tion of the acknowledged requirement that the military must be
kept subordinate to the civil power.
The thesis advanced by Attorney General Bates in 1861 was
the thesis advanced by his successor on the government's behalf
in the Milligan case when it was argued in 1866. The rationale
the Court used in Milligan for rejecting that particular applica-
tion of Bates's thesis, reaches and discredits the whole.
Nevertheless, for several years after the Milligan decision,
excusing peril, by the President." Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 142.
6. 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 74, 83-84 (1861).
7. Id. at 79. The historical background of the Commander-in-Chief clause is the
struggle between Crown and Parliament for control over the military forces in England,
culminating in Parliament's disavowal of the power of military command after the Res-
toration. See 13 Car. 2, stat. 1, ch. 6, § 1 (1661). The history of the requirement of subor-
dination of the military to the civilian power is quite different, having to do with claimed
prerogative power to intrude with military force into the affairs of governance otherwise
proceeding according to the laws of the realm.
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flagrant and willful disregard of the constitutional principle the
Supreme Court had applied characterized the process of "recon-
structing" the South.' It should not seem remarkable, therefore,
that during the past several years, despite the above quoted
statements of Chief Justice Burger and the constitutional doc-
trine to which those dicta refer, new foundations have been laid
for military intervention in the United States.
In 1972, the Nixon administration promulgated a set of new
"Civil Disturbance Regulations" claiming color of legality for
very substantial potential military intrusions into the realm of
domestic civil government.9 The 1972 Regulations took the place
of others first devised in 1968 during the Johnson administra-
tion, 10 which themselves had been objectionable on some points
of law; but novel provisions in the new Regulations dramatically
increased the potential for domestic use of the national military
while at the same time substantially reducing prior safeguards
against abuse. Then, a year later, the Nixon administration
employed the military in law enforcement in a situation which
not even those indulgent new Regulations had contemplated.' It
would have been notable enough if these events were merely
manifestations of the militaristic aura which shrouded that par-
ticular administration even to its last days.12 However, the 1972
8. See infra text accompanying notes 100-21.
9. Employment of Military Resources in the Event of Civil Disturbances, 37 Fed.
Reg. 3637 (1972), 32 C.F.R. § 215 (1981).
10. 33 Fed. Reg. 9339 (1968). These earlier regulations were discontinued in 1971,
see 36 Fed. Reg. 21339 (1971). Meanwhile, regulations entitled Employment of Troops in
Aid of Civil Authorities were promulgated at 34 Fed. Reg. 14126 (1969), 32 C.F.R. § 501
(1981).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 233-34.
12. During the final two weeks of President Nixon's term of office, before his resig-
nation, there was enough apprehension concerning possible untoward use of military
units, either against Congress (which was considering impeachment) or otherwise, that
the Secretary of Defense initiated extraordinary measures to closely oversee the military
lines of command and to ensure that any possible irregular White House orders would
not be obeyed. Pentagon Kept Tight Rein in Last Days of Nixon Rule, N.Y. Times, Aug.
25, 1974, at 1, col. 3; Military Coup Fears Denied, Wash. Post, Aug. 27, 1974, at A4, col.
4.
The team of advisors counselling Gerald Ford on matters of transition as he suc-
ceeded to the presidency in Nixon's stead urged a cutback in the military influence at
the White House, which the transition team perceived had become excessive under
Nixon. Transition Team Urged Military Influence Curb, Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1974, at
A2, col. 3. The Army General, Alexander Haig, who had been President Nixon's White
House Chief of Staff since May, 1973, and who was identified by Ford's transition team
as of particular concern, had until that assignment served briefly as Vice Chief of Staff of
the Army. It was in that capacity during February, March, and April, 1973, that General
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Civil Disturbance Regulations have remained in force through
three subsequent administrations without any modification; and
Justice Department lawyers have continued all this time to
defend those responsible for the 1973 use of the military even
beyond what those Regulations allow. Moreover, in March, 1982,
the Department of Defense issued new regulations entitled
"DOD Cooperation With Civilian Law Enforcement Officials,""
which rely upon and reassert the sweeping claims of executive
prerogative for military intervention asserted in the Civil Distur-
bance Regulations.
Thus, notwithstanding the statements from the judiciary,
within little more than a decade the executive branch of the
United States government has consolidated the old, and added
several new, foundations for military intervention in the United
States. It would be idle for a legal scholar to speculate whether
any edifice of oppression is likely to be built upon these founda-
tions, whether soon or later in time. A sufficient task for the
legal scholar is to disclose that the foundations, although faulty,
indeed are there; to explain how those foundations came to be
laid; and, to show that they have no footing on the bedrock of
our law."
Haig had been a principal participant in planning and supervising the extraordinary epi-
sode of military intervention mentioned supra in the text accompanying footnote 11 and
discussed much later in this article. A year earlier, Haig had been Deputy to the Assis-
tant to the President for National Security Affairs (Henry Kissinger) at the time when
the new Civil Disturbance Regulations were being prepared, although it is not public
knowledge whether or to what extent he might have been involved in their preparation.
Subsequently, of course, Haig was appointed NATO Commander. Later retiring from the
Army, Haig briefly courted a nomination for the presidency, and then in 1981 became
Secretary of State.
13. 32 C.F.R. § 213 (1982), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 185-90 and
199-200.
14. Some of the material examined in this article has been previously discussed by
this author in earlier publications: Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots and Revolution: The Law
and History of Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L. Rzv. 1 (1971); Engdahl,
Renzo & Laitos, A Comprehensive Study of the Use of Military Troops in Civil Disor-
ders With Proposals for Legislative Reform, 43 U. COLO. L. Rav. 399 (1972); and Eng-
dahl, The New Civil Disturbance Regulations: The Threat of Military Intervention, 49
IND. L. REv. 581 (1974). The thesis of those earlier articles has been endorsed and
applied by some other writers, e.g., Meeks, Illegal Law Enforcement: Aiding Civil
Authorities in Violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, 70 him. L. Ra. 83 (Dept. of Army
Pamphlet 27-100-70, 1975); Comment, Executive Military Power: A Path to American
Dictatorship, 54 NEB. L. Rlv. 111 (1975). That thesis has also been extensively criticized
in Pye & Lowell, The Criminal Process During Civil Disorders, 1975 Dus, L.J. 581.
Because of the intervening commentary, this author has carefully reexamined the prem-
ises and the substance of his views and has concluded that his thesis is thoroughly
sound. Specific response to some of the contentions of Pye & Lowell is made in footnotes
1983]
6 University of Puget Sound Law Review
II. THE BEDROCK OF CIVILIAN DUE PROCESS
The American colonists of the mid-eighteenth century were
British subjects who considered themselves heirs to the liberties
that had been won through the struggles of what was then rela-
tively recent English history. Increasingly, however, they came
to perceive the king of their time as hostile to the liberties thus
claimed. How the facts might have appeared to those across the
Atlantic, or how they might be viewed in retrospect by more
modern historians, is not relevant to the conceptions that pre-
vailed on these shores at that time, or to the precepts which
their convictions led those early Americans to ordain.
The single most inflammatory mark of the tyranny they
perceived was the use of the royal military troops contrary to
what the Americans believed was allowed by established princi-
ples of English law.15 Increasingly after 1763, British troops were
used instead of civil magistrates and the posse to suppress disor-
ders in the colonies, royal military authority thus effectively
superseding or suspending ordinary processes of the law. It
could have been no comfort to the colonists that on some occa-
sions the king, whom they considered a tyrant, had indulged
similar abuses in the homeland.16 Even there, the thesis that
such use of the military was illegal received some expression; 17 in
the American colonies, this thesis became an expressed point of
rebellion.18
In their own written constitutions adopted after indepen-
dence, the several American states included various provisions
designed to preclude such domestic applications of military
force. 19 The weak national government the Americans first cre-
ated was given no power to maintain an armed force of its own;
the Articles of Confederation agreed to by the Continental Con-
where appropriate herein.
15. The history only cursorily surveyed here was extensively discussed and docu-
mented by this author in Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution, The Law and History of Mili-
tary Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Soldiers,
Riots, and Revolution]. The reader is urged to resort to that work for fuller exposition.
16. Pye & Lowell, supra note 14, at 669 n.268, report statistics concerning civilian
casualties from domestic military actions in England between 1740 and 1780, citing G.
RUD, THE CROWD IN HISTORY: A STUDY OF POPULAR DISTURBANCES IN FRANCE AND ENG-
LAND 1730-1848 (1964).
17. See, e.g., W. JONES, LEGAL MODE OF SUPPRESSING RIOTS (1780).
18. See Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution, supra note 15, at 26-28, and the revolution-
ary era documents quoted infra in the text accompanying notes 39-43.
19. See Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution, supra note 15, at 28-30.
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gress in 1777 and subsequently ratified by the states even pro-
hibited any state from maintaining regular armed forces,
"except such number only, as in the judgment of the United
States, in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to gar-
rison the forts necessary for the defense of such state. ,,'o
They did not wish to be open to assault by alien powers, but the
Americans would not countenance any risk of military interven-
tion in domestic civilian affars-a risk which their own experi-
ence with British troops in the late colonial period had taught
them to associate with standing armies. They were familiar with
riots, mobs, and disorders; but they considered any military
response to such exigencies intolerable, and resolved to rely
instead upon civil magistrates, the traditional posse, and the
process of civilian law.
The new Constitution proposed in 1787 met with opposition
on several grounds; but no feature of the new plan was more
controversial than the provision it made for the maintenance of
a national army,21 even though such maintenance was to be at
the discretion of the legislative branch to be exercised at least
each second year.22 The specter of military law enforcement and
military suppression of disorders had not lost its horror. When
the Pennsylvania state ratifying convention met, one third of the
delegates demanded amendments, several of which were aimed
at the specter of military law enforcement; voted against ratifi-
cation when the amendments were refused by the majority; and,
afterwards published and widely disseminated a pamphlet
denouncing the Constitution as countenancing execution of the
laws by military force .2  Hamilton and Madison rushed to
20. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI, cl. 4.
21. See Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution, supra note 15, at 35-39.
22. "The Congress shall have Power ... To raise and support Armies, but no
Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years." U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
23. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the
State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, 1787, in 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BELL OF
RIGHT: A DocuMENTARY HISTORY 662, 671 (1971). The amendments they had proposed
to remedy this evil would have: (a) forbidden standing armies during peace, no. 7; (b)
reserved principal power over the militia to the states and restricted their availability for
use outside their home states, no. 11; (c) provided, as nearly all of the state constitutions
did, that "the military shall be kept under strict subordination to, and be governed by
the civil powers," no. 7; and (d) added a truncated version of the anti-military guarantee
of Chapter 39 of Magna Carte (see infra text accompanying note 30) providing "that no
man be deprived of his liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of his
peers," no. 3, 2 B. SCHWARTZ, id. at 665.
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answer this denunciation in their Federalist Papers, insisting
that no use of military force was contemplated for situations
short of armed insurrection.2 4 Ratification in Delaware, New
Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut, and Massachusetts was accom-
plished without major excitement over the military law enforce-
ment issue; but in April, May, and June, 1788, that issue was
partly responsible for the opposition of one third of the dele-
gates in South Carolina and caused several proposed amend-
ments to accompany Maryland's and New Hampshire's ratifica-
tions.2 5  Madison's own state, Virginia, accompanied its
24. Responding in three successive numbers of THE FEDERALIST (Nos. 27, 28, 29) to
the Pennsylvanians' accusation that the proposed Constitution contemplated the new
national government employing "the aid of a military force to execute the laws," Alexan-
der Hamilton insisted that the provision for military force was only for seditions and
insurrections, "to preserve the peace of the community and to maintain the just author-
ity of the laws against those violent invasions of them which amount to insurrections
and rebellions." THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 178-79 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)
(emphasis added). Non-military means, Hamilton insisted, were available and would be
sufficient in all except situations of insurrection: because federal law would be supreme
and operate directly upon the citizens, binding local officials in their dealings with citi-
zens as much as any state law could, the Constitution
would enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each
[state], in the execution of its laws .... Thus the legislatures, courts, and
magistrates of the respective members, will be incorporated into the operations
of the national government as far as its just and constitutional authority
extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.
THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 176-77 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis
deleted). If this should not be enough to accomplish the execution of federal laws, Ham-
ilton argued, still there would be no cause for recourse to a military expedient, for by
virtue of the necessary and proper clause Congress could provide for the use of citizens
as a posse comitatus to assist the officers entrusted with execution of the federal laws.
THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 183 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). The military expe-
dient was only provided for "times of insurrection . . . to guard the public against the
violence of faction or sedition." Id. at 187.
Discussing in THE FEDERALIST No. 43 the "domestic Violence" provision of the guar-
anty clause, James Madison described it as authorizing the national government "to sup-
port the State authority" in the event of "insurrection in a State," instances of "violent
factions, flying to arms and tearing a State to pieces;" and he quoted in support of the
provision a statement of Montesquieu regarding "a popular insurrection." THE FEDERAL-
iST No. 43, at 276-77 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
25. As to South Carolina, see the speech of Mr. Dollard, in 2 B. SCHWARTZ supra
note 23, at 752-53. New Hampshire proposed prohibiting any standing army in time of
peace except upon three-fourths vote of both houses of Congress, no. 10; 2 B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 23, at 761. Maryland rejected a standing army prohibition, but demanded
several others respecting the military, including one prohibiting subjecting the militia to
martial law except in time of war, invasion, or rebellion. In support of this the Maryland
convention made specific reference to Magna Carta and the rule based upon it recited by
Coke, Hale, and Blackstone, see infra note 39, holding that martial law powers could not
be employed except in time of war, invasion, or rebellion. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23,
at 734-35.
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ratification with demands for several amendments aimed at the
specter of military law enforcement, as did Hamilton's own state
of New York."6 These demands persuaded Madison that amend-
ments were desirable, and it was he who insistently pressed
upon the first Congress the task of preparing amendments to
propose to the states. He sought concise phrases to capture the
import of those state convention demands he found to have
merit. The language which he chose, which Congress approved,
and which the states ratified to assuage the fears of military law
enforcement was that "[n]o person shall. . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law."'2 7
26. Virginia demanded clauses providing- (a) that no standing army be kept in peace
except upon two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress, amend, no. 9; (b) "[t]hat, in all
cases, the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil
power," declaration of rights no. 17; (c) "that all power of suspending laws, or the execu-
tion of laws, by any authority, without the consent of the representatives of the people in
the legislature, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised," declaration of
rights no. 7; and (d) as a more complete recitation of the anti-military guarantee of
Chapter 39 of Magna Carta (see infra text accompanying note 30) "that no freeman
ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, privileges, or
franchises, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life,
liberty, or property, but by the law of the land," declaration of rights no. 9. 2 B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 841-43. Virginia also demanded a provision like that
demanded by Maryland, see supra note 25; amend, no. 11, 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note
23, at 843.
New York prefaced its ratification with a long list of declared rights, which it
referred to as "explanations ... consistent with the said Constitution," and which it
expressed confidence would receive "an early and mature Consideration.. . ." Among
the "explanatory" provisions thus proposed by New York were: (a) a clause providing
"that standing Armies in time of Peace are dangerous to Liberty, and ought not to be
kept up, except in Cases of necessity;" (b) a clause like that demanded by Maryland
recalling the precept of Coke, Hale and Blackstone, see supra note 25; (c) a clause pro-
viding "that at all times, the Military should be under strict subordination to the civil
Power;" and (d) a clause similar to Virginia's recitation of the anti-military guarantee of
Magna Carta, providing "that no person ought to be taken imprisoned or disseised of his
freehold, or be exiled or deprived of his Privileges, Franchises, Life, Liberty or Property
but by due process of Law." 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 911-14. New York also
urged that, pending consideration of these "explanatory" amendments, its militia not be
used outside New York for a longer period than six weeks without the consent of the
state legislature-a further reflection of apprehensiveness over possible military enforce-
ment of federal law. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 914.
27. Madison opposed prohibiting a standing army, but it is clear from THz FEDER4L-
wr Nos. 27-29, 43, supra note 24, that neither he nor Hamilton countenanced military
law enforcement (whether by regular army or by militia) except in situations of insurrec-
tion. He could not ignore the vigorous demands for some textual provision to ensure that
military law enforcement in lesser situations would be precluded, however. As one knowl-
edgeable in the law, he must have been aware that the precept of military subordination
to civil powers and the prohibition of prerogative suspension of the laws were but corol-
laries of the older and more fundamental principle of Chapter 39 of Magna Carts. See
infra text accompanying notes 30-43. Separate statement of the corollaries would be
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No concise set of words could better have comprehended
the traditional English prohibition against the use of military
force for law enforcement than this phrase guaranteeing "due
process of law." Long before the rise of a professional army, able
Englishmen had been required to keep arms and to answer, on
the one hand, the call of the sheriff as a posse, and on the other
hand, the call of the constable or the Earl Marshal to war.
2 8
However, very different rules governed their actions in these two
different capacities. When men in arms in the year 1381 rose to
suppress the mob violence of the Peasants' Revolt, and used
measures beyond those allowed by the rules applicable to the
civilian sheriff and posse, that recourse to such measures as were
allowable only for war was a crime; and the crime would have
been punishable had King Richard II not issued a pardon to the
overzealous suppressors. The terms of the pardon are significant:
those who had employed measures appropriate only to war were
pardoned for the acts they had done sans due process de loye,
without due process of law.29
The pledge of King John by Chapter 39 of Magna Carta in
1215 that no free man would be taken, imprisoned, or destroyed
except "by the law of the land," had itself been demanded by
unnecessary if the fundamental principle were affirmed. In the interest of concise state-
ment the redundant verbiage of the thirteenth century charter provision, as elaborately
recited in the Virginia and New York proposals, could be excised: to say that neither life,
nor liberty, nor property could be touched by military prerogative, was sufficient to say it
all. Magna Carta, however, did not foreclose Parliament from authorizing military
expedients; and therefore to have used its original phrase, "the law of the land," as the
Virginia proposal had, would not have answered the fears that Congress might provide
for militia or army execution of the laws. Madison expressly declared that he found the
English guarantees deficient precisely in that they did not foreclose Parliamentary
abuses; and he was resolved to have limitations as effective against the legislative as
against the executive branch. See Madison's speech introducing his proposed amend-
ments, 1 ANNALS Ov CONG. 453-54 (J. Gales ed. 1789), reprinted in 2 B. SCHwARTZ, supra
note 23, at 1028-29. Therefore he chose for his concise formulation of the anti-military
principle of Chapter 39 of Magna Carta the alternative phrase that had been used in
New York's proposed provision: "due process of law." See 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23,
at 855-56. This suitably adapted the clause, as it appears in the fifth amendment, to bind
Congress as well as the executive to civilian processes as distinguished from military
expedients in all dealings that might impact the life, liberty, or property of the people.
Closing their eyes to this background of the language chosen by Madison and quietly
accepted even by those states which had been most insistent upon effective assurances
against military law enforcement, Pye & Lowell, supra note 14, at 657, blandly assert:
"We are aware of no evidence that the due process clause of the fifth amendment was
intended to deal at all with the subject of military aid to the civil power." Ignoscunt ut
ignarent. See also infra note 44.
28. See Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution, supra note 14, at 3-5.
29. 5 Rich. 2, stat. 1, ch. 5 (1831).
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the barons at Runnymede specifically because the king had
theretofore enforced his will by military means in preference to
civilian process. King Edward II, a century later, in 1322, used
knights in arms to seize and punish some dissident nobles; when
it convened at the accession of that king's successor in 1327,
Parliament made explicit reference to Chapter 39 of Magna
Carta in denouncing King Edward's resort to such military
meanss o
Tudors and the first Stuart monarchs nonetheless claimed a
broad prerogative power to deal with their subjects by what. was
then called "martial law." This Tudor and Stuart concept of
"martial law" prerogative must be distinguished from the law of
military discipline applied in the old Court of the Constable and
Marshal or the more modern counterpart rules for the discipline
of armed forces; and it must be distinguished as well from what
might better be called "the law of martial rule" or "military gov-
ernment." The "martial law" power claimed by Tudor and Stu-
art monarchs included the asserted right to intervene by prerog-
ative in the domestic affairs of the kingdom on grounds of
purported necessity, suspending or superseding the ordinary law
and its processes, whether to require the quartering of troops in
private houses; or to exact so-called "ship money" or other
assessments or forced "loans;" or to carry out summary trials
and punishments; or to suppress civil disorders with military
force. As part of this broad "martial law" prerogative, by the
late sixteenth century Lord-Lieutenants under royal commis-
sion, with troops assigned to assist them, had become the usual
means for suppressing commotions and civil disorders in Eng-
land, superseding the sheriffs and other regular civil officials. 3'
James I emulated the Tudor example when disorders arose
where he had quartered troops awaiting transport abroad.32
Under Charles I, the patience of the English with these abuses
at last ran out. In 1627 Charles' quartering impositions led to
riots and brawls in port towns, which were suppressed with mili-
tary force under prerogative commissioners on the Tudor model.
30. Thomas Earl of Lancaster's Case, in 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 343-46 (1st Am. ed. 1947); Edmund Earl of Kent's Case, in M. HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 40-41 (2d ed. 1716).
31. See Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution, supra note 14, at 9.
32. An example of the military commissions for riot suppression issued by James I is
published in 17 RYMER, FOEDERA, CONVENTIONES, ET CUJUSCUNQUE GENERIS ACTA PUs-
LICA 647 (2d ed. 1726).
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These events, and the burdens of financial exactions based upon
the same claim of a broad "martial law" prerogative, excited
Parliament in 1628 to draw up the Petition of Right, which
denounced the whole range of actions taken by virtue of the"martial law" prerogative as contrary to the law of the realm,
and specifically, Magna Carta.s In the years that followed, the
continued exaction of "ship money" fueled burning resentment
against King Charles, and his continued claim to prerogative
domestic use of troops helped to precipitate the civil wars which
commenced in 1642.2
After the Restoration, the repudiation of a prerogative
"martial law" power was reaffirmed. 5 Nevertheless, when it was
perceived that James I's keeping of some 30,000 private troops
omened a possible return of earlier Stuart abuses, the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 and the Bill of Rights of 1689 ousted James
and conditioned the maintenance of any standing army within
the kindgom upon Parliament's approval. More significantly,
addressing the issue of Tudor-Stuart "martial law" prerogative
to supersede civil process and execute the laws with military
force, the Bill of Rights specifically declared: "That the pre-
tended power of suspending of laws, or the execution of laws, by
royal authority without consent of Parliament, is illegal." 6
These great events of the seventeenth century firmly settled
the principle that the use of the military to enforce law and
order is not "due process of law." The Riot Act enacted by Par-
liament in 1714 3 called for civilian officials and the posse comi-
tatus to disperse mobs and suppress civil disorders, and author-
ized those civilian personnel to use any degree of force necessary
33. The sweeping significance of the Petition of Right is sadly misstated by Pye &
Lowell. They assert that "[tihe Petition of Right forbade only the practice of punishing
those apprehended during the military suppression of riots by illegal tribunals. It did not
affect the ability of the Crown to use the military to suppress riots." Pye & Lowell, supra
note 14, at 668. Quite the contrary is evident on the face of the Petition. What was
declaimed was the whole range of "martial law" prerogative, explicitly including preroga-
tive financial exactions, quartering, and the issuance and execution of the military com-
missions, "which commissions, and all other of like nature, are wholly and directly con-
trary to said laws and statutes of this your realm." One thing called for by those
commissions was the summary military trial and execution of offenders; but another
thing equally called for by those commissions was military suppression of the disorders
themselves.
34. See Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution, supra note 14, at 10-14.
35. M. HALE, THE HIsToRY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 39-40 (2d ed. 1716).
36. 1 W. & M. 2, ch. 2, decl. 1 (1689).
37. 1 Geo. 1, stat. 2, ch. 5 (1714).
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to accomplish the purpose; but that Act notably made no provi-
sion whatsoever for any use of military troops. It is instructive to
contrast that 1714 Act concerning riots and civil disorders with a
different act passed by Parliament in the very same year. The
latter dealt, not with riots or civil disorders, but with "insurrec-
tion" or "rebellion" as well as "invasion;" and for these situa-
tions, unlike for riots and disorders, it authorized the use of
militia. 8
The foregoing was history as recent to the American colo-
nists as the Great War, the Great Depression, and the New Deal
are to Americans today. Thus, as the colonists treasured their
heritage, it should not seem surprising that when British soldiers
were used to suppress civil disorders in the American colonies it
appeared to the Americans that King George was making claim
to the same prerogative powers the Tudors and Stuarts had
abused. When clashes between troops and disaffected colonists
resulted in casualties among the civilians, colonists could claim
the authority of Coke and Hale as well as Blackstone to decry
those deaths as murders.3 ' When the Administration of Justice
Act4" was applied to prevent local colonial trials of the British
soldiers involved in such incidents, the Second Continental Con-
gress enumerated among the causes for taking up arms that
38. 1 Geo. 1, stat. 2, ch. 14 (1714), revived and continued, 9 Geo. 1, ch. 8 (1722) and
7 Geo. 2, ch. 23 (1734). The latter specifically provided that the lieutenants should have
no greater powers than they had under the Restoration statutes of 13, 14, and 15 Charles
II, 7 Geo. 2, ch. 23, § 3 (1734).
Only much later did the notion emerge that militia, and even regular troops, could
be used "not as soldiers, but as citizens," to constitute the posse comitatus for suppres-
sion of riot as distinguished from rebellion; see infra text accompanying notes 73-76.
When historians telescope decades into a few sentences, important stages of development
can be obscured.
Furthermore, the legal historian must often distinguish between what was conceived
to be lawful and what was sometimes nonetheless done. In later years, riots and disorders
short of insurrection or rebellion in various parts of the far-flung British Empire were
indeed suppressed with military force; but in such instances it became the practice for
Parliament to enact acts of indemnity to immunize the troops. The rise of this practice
but confirms the point: just as the suppressors of the Peasants' Revolt had required the
King's pardon, see supra text accompanying note 29, so these soldiers required immuniz-
ing legislation, precisely because their military suppression of such disorders was "with-
out due process of law."
39. "[I1f a lieutenant, or other, that hath commission of martial authority, doth in
time of peace hang or otherwise execute any man by colour of martial law, this is mur-
der; for it is against magna carta cap. 29 [sic]." I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 400 (1765) (quoting E. COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 52 (1644)). See also M.
HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 39-40 (2d ed. 1716).
40. 14 Geo. 3, ch. 39 (1774).
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Act's "exempting the 'murderers' of colonists from legal trial,
and in effect, from punishment." ' In their Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the Americans pronounced King and Parliament to be
lawless tyrants not only "for quartering large bodies of armed
troops among us," but also "for protecting them by a mock
Trial, from Punishment for any Murders which they should
commit on the Inhabitants of these States. ' 42 By intruding with
military troops instead of relying upon civilian officials and pro-
cedures to deal with domestic disorders, the Declaration of Inde-
pendence maintained, the King had "affected to render the mili-
tary independent of and superior to the Civil Power." 43 The
Americans saw King George as King Charles, and themselves as
asserting (less obsequiously than the 1628 Parliament) the law
of the Petition of Right, repudiating the latter-day revival of
Tudor-Stuart "martial law" prerogative, and vindicating the
established "law of the land." Their insistence through amend-
ment to their new Constitution that the national government
not impact life, liberty, or property "without due process of
law," was conditioned in major part by their fear of domestic use
of the national military force they had newly provided for; they
would not have it used, as the British army had been, as a
means to suppress civil disorder or execute the laws.4
41. 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 145 (W. Ford ed. 1905).
42. The Declaration of Independence para. 13, 17 (U.S. 1776).
43. Id. at para. 14. To the same effect, but even more explicitly invoking the due
process tradition, the preamble to the South Carolina Constitution of 1776 recited that
King George had "dispensed with the law of the land, and substituted the law martial in
its stead.. . ." S.C. CONST. (1776), printed in 2 PooRE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTI-
TUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1615,
1616 (2d ed. 1878).
44. In 1861, Chief Justice Taney explicitly declared that the due process clause of
the fifth amendment forbids executive recourse to military intervention for law enforce-
ment. On May 25, 1861, John Merryman had been seized by federal troops at his home
in Maryland, a state which had not seceded and where federal (as well as state) civilian
authority was intact. While he was being held at Fort McHenry for supposed treason,
Merryman's counsel presented a petition for writ of habeas corpus to Chief Justice
Taney. The writ was issued, but the general to whom it was directed disobeyed. Taney
then delivered an opinion which was given extraordinary circulation and excited wide-
spread commentary in the Congress, the cabinet, and the press of both North and South.
Taney declared that he was ruling on the case, not merely as Circuit Justice, but as
"Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States at Chambers," see Swisher,
The Taney Period, 1836-64, in V HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
848, 849 n.26 (1974), although the report of his opinion erroneously identifies it as an
opinion at circuit, Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9847).
Merryman is ordinarily cited for its holding concerning habeas corpus; but the decision
also reaches the due process issue of military law enforcement. In response to the pur-
[Vol. 7:1
1983] Foundations for Military Intervention
This repudiation of military intervention in domestic law
ported justification that Merryman's military arrest and confinement was pursuant to
presidential authority, the Chief Justice declared that the President
[ils not empowered to arrest any one charged with an offence against the
United States, and whom he may, from the evidence before him, believe to be
guilty; nor can he authorize any officer, civil or military, to exercise this power,
for the fifth article of the amendments to the constitution expressly provides
that no person 'Shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due pro-
cess of law'-that is, judicial process.
With such provisions in the constitution, expressed in language too clear
to be misunderstood by any one, I can see no ground whatever for supposing
that the president, in any emergency, or in any state of things, can authorize
. . . the arrest of a citizen, except in aid of the judicial power.
17 F. Cas. at 149. Reinforcing his due process thesis by reference to the English heritage
outlined in the text above, Chief Justice Taney continued:
Indeed, the security against imprisonment by executive authority, pro-
vided for in the fifth article of the amendments to the constitution, which I
have before quoted, is nothing more than a copy of a like provision in the
English constitution, which had been firmly established before the declaration
of independence.
17 F. Cas. at 150. Stressing that the case, and his opinion, went beyond the habeas
corpus issue, Taney continued:
But the documents before me show, that the military authority in this case
has gone far beyond the mere suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. It has, by force of arms, thrust aside the judicial authorities and
officers to whom the constitution has confided the power and duty of interpret-
ing and administering the laws, and substituted a military government in its
place, to be administered and executed by military officers.
The constitution provides, as I have before said, that 'no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.'
These great and fundamental laws, which Congress itself could not sus-
pend, have been disregarded and suspended.. . by a military order, supported
by force of arms. Such is the case now before me, and I can only say that if the
authority which the constitution has confided to the judiciary department and
judicial officers, may thus, upon any pretext or under any circumstances, be
usurped by the military power, at its discretion, the people of the United
States are no longer living under a government of laws, but every citizen holds
life, liberty and property at the will and pleasure of the army officer in whose
military district he may happen to be found.
17 F. Cas. at 152. At this point the Chief Justice dropped a footnote, declaring:
The constitution of the United States is founded upon the principle of
government set forth and maintained in the Declaration of Independence. In
that memorable instrument the people of the several colonies declared, that
one of the causes which 'impelled' them to 'dissolve the political bands' which
connected them with the British nation, and justified them in withdrawing
their allegiance from the British sovereign, was that 'he (the King) had
affected to render the military independent of, and superior to, the civil
power.,
17 F. Cas. at 152 n.3. Taney ordered the court clerk to transmit a copy of his opinion to
the President. A short time thereafter, Merryman was released to civilian authorities
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enforcement is the bedrock of due process upon which American
government was built. Together with a concept which the early
American statesmen drew from a doctrine propounded by Lord
Chief Justice Mansfield in 1780, after the Revolution but before
the Constitution-a doctrine to be examined at length later in
this article4'5 -this is the tradition and the legal premise upon
which the first Congresses under the United States Constitution
acted when they first came to legislate concerning the use of the
military in America. That earliest legislation will be examined
below, after first taking note of the several grounds of authority
that the 1972 Civil Disturbance Regulations claim.
III. FAULTY FOUNDATIONS, PART ONE: PURPORTED STATUTORY
BASES OF THE CivIL DISTURBANCE REGULATIONS
The stated purpose of the new Civil Disturbance Regula-
tions imposed in 1972 and still in force, is to establish policies
and furnish guidance for the utilization of federal troops and
other Defense Department resources 6 "[iln support of civil
authorities during civil disturbances" and "[in other related
instances where military resources may be used to protect life or
Federal property or to prevent disruption of Federal
functions."'47
These 1972 Regulations articulate at length their purported
after being indicted for treason by a grand jury; he was then released on bail, and never
prosecuted. See Swisher, supra, at 853.
Although Chief Justice Taney died in 1864, before the whole Court had opportunity
to address this same issue, his view was clearly confirmed by the decision of the Supreme
Court in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), see supra note 5 and accompany-
ing text.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 75-78.
46. "Military resources include military and civilian personnel, facilities, equipment
and supplies under the control of a DOD component." 32 C.F.R. § 215.3(c). This defini-
tion does not encompass state National Guard troops that have not been federalized.
This article does not concern itself with the legal issues pertaining to state use of
National Guard resources. Rather, its focus is solely upon the domestic use of national
(i.e., federal) military resources.
The National Guard as organized in each constituent state of the Union is a state
military force, for practical purposes the modern successor to the earlier state militia.
Each member of each state's National Guard is also-but separately in contemplation of
law-a member of the "National Guard of the United States," which is a reserve compo-
nent of the federal armed forces. As such they may be called to active duty, or "federal-
ized," even temporarily, and individually or as units. Federalized National Guardsmen
are part of the national armed forces, and like the militia of an earlier day when called
up for federal duty, are within the scope of this article.
47. 32 C.F.R. § 215.1 (1982).
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legal bases.' 8 The 1968 Regulations which the new ones replaced
articulated some of the same purported bases;4 9 but the bases
claimed for the 1972 Regulations are more numerous and far
broader, including sweeping claims of inherent executive power.
The breadth and significance of these newly asserted prerogative
powers will be examined later in this article; the purported stat-
utory bases must be examined first.
The new and current 1972 Civil Disturbance Regulations,
like the old 1968 Regulations, rely as authority for the domestic
use of troops in certain circumstances upon three federal stat-
utes, originating generations apart but presently codified as 10
U.S.C. sections 331, 332, and 333.49-1 These must each be
examined in turn.
A. 10 U.S.C. § 331
Whenever there is an insurrection in any state against its
government, the President may, upon the request of its legisla-
ture or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened,
call into federal service such of the militia" of the other States,
in the number requested by that State, and use such of the
armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the
insurrection.
This statute is derived from section 1 of the very first stat-
ute enacted by Congress pertaining to military troops and
domestic turmoil, a statute enacted in 1792.' The 1792 Act was
drafted and adopted in lieu of a provision that was stricken from
the Senate version of the so-called Militia Bill a few weeks ear-
lier because of vigorous opposition in the House.2 The unac-
48. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4 (1982).
49. 32 C.F.R. § 187.4 (1971).
49.1. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-33 (1976).
50. The modern counterpart of the state's militia is the National Guard, which,
when called into federal service, is a part of the national armed forces. See supra note
46.
51. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264. Section 1 of the original statute is set
forth infra note 55. As originally enacted it authorized only the use of federalized state
militia; but after the development of standing federal armed forces another enactment in
1807 authorized the President to use "for the same purposes, such part of the land or
naval force of the United States, as shall be judged necessary ... " Act of March 3,
1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443.
To avoid confusion, this article refers to the 1792 Act, rather than to the act which
actually superseded it in 1795. See infra note 68.
52. The Militia Bill was Congress's first measure under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16,
"[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia .. " As finally
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ceptable proposal had provided that the President could call out
troops "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections,
and repel invasion."5 The House debate on that proposal" indi-
cates that there was no apprehensiveness over the use of mili-
tary force in circumstances so grave as invasion or insurrection,
but that the prospect of military force for law enforcement in
any lesser exigency was the subject of very serious concern. Sec-
tion 1 of the Act that was finally adopted a few weeks later
omitted any reference to executing the laws of the Union, and
instead dealt only with the extreme circumstances in which it
was agreed that distinctively military force is warranted: inva-
sion, and insurrection against the government of a state. So
much of that section as pertained to insurrection as distin-
guished from invasion is the antecedent of today's 10 U.S.C. sec-
tion 331.56
What is contemplated by the term "insurrection" in 10
U.S.C. section 331 is something quite different from riot, tumult,
or civil disorder.
enacted, the Bill became the Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271.
53. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 114-15 (1792).
54. Id. at 553-55 (1792). See also Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution, supra note 14, at
44.
55. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever the United States
shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation
or Indian tribe, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, to call
forth such number of the militia of the state or states most convenient to the
place of danger or scene of action, as he may judge necessary to repel such
invasion, and to issue his orders for that purpose, to such officer or officers of
the militia as he shall think proper; and in case of an insurrection in any state,
against the government thereof, it shall be lawful for the President of the
United States, on application of the legislature of such state, or of the execu-
tive (when the legislature cannot be convened) to call forth such number of the
militia of any state or states, as may be applied for, or as he may judge suffi-
cient to suppress such insurrection.
Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 1, 1 Stat. 264. See also supra note 51 and infra note 68.
56. It will be noted that the statute only authorizes the President to call in militia
from states other than the requesting state. The National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders found this to be curious and "apparently unintended." REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DisoRDtRs 288 (Gov't Print. Office 1968). The
Commission could think of no reason why the President's use of the requesting state's
own militia should not have been provided for.
If the Commission had been more alert to the history and purpose of the statute,
however, it would have been apparent that the draftsmen were not careless, and that it
made perfect sense for them to say exactly what they said. It is to be expected that a
state faced with an insurrection would employ its own militia as a matter of course, and
that federal assistance would be needed only when the state's own militia proved inade-
quate to the task so that outside help was needed.
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In the case of an actual insurrection, organized political
society is in extremis; the situation is tantamount to war. In
such circumstances, it is necessary and appropriate for the gov-
ernment to employ force which is distinctively military in char-
acter. It was only in such extreme situations-foreign invasion
and genuine insurrection-and never in cases of mere riot or
civil disorder, that the English tradition which the founding
fathers endeavored to preserve permitted the domestic applica-
tion of distinctively military force;
Elements of this English tradition-Magna Carta, four-
teenth century precedents, the Petition of Right, and the
English Bill of Rights-have already been mentioned. 7 English
legislation for dealing with riots and disorders short of insurrec-
tion had respected this tradition. The first English riot act had
been enacted in 1411, and in accordance with the already estab-
lished tradition, it had provided for suppression of riots only by
the posse comitatus under the command of civil officers." Dur-
ing the Wars of the Roses and under the Tudors, absolutist
monarchs did resort to the expedient of putting down civil dis-
turbances with military force; but legal scholars of that period
and our own agree that those actions were in violation of the law
of the land." As declared later in the Petition of Right, the prac-
tice of dealing with riots by military means was "wholly and
directly contrary to the said laws and statutes of this your
realm." 60
When England was beset with scattered riots and distur-
bances in protest of the Hanoverian succesion in 1714, Parlia-
ment enacted a new riot act to correct the defects which the
developments of three centuries had created in the old. Just like
the 1411 statute, however, the 1714 riot act provided for sup-
pressing riots with the posse comitatus under the control and
command of the ordinary local civilian officers, and contained
not a hint of any authorization for the use of military troops to
suppress any civil disorder, however aggravated the circum-
stances might be.6' Writing a few years later, Lord Chief Justice
57. See supra text accompanying notes 28-38.
58. 13 Hen. 4, ch. 7 (1411).
59. F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HIsToRY OF ENGLAND 266-68 (1908). See
Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution, supra note 14, at 9-10.
60. 3 Car. 1, ch. 1, § 8 (1629). See supra note 33.
61. 1 Geo. 1, stat. 2, ch. 5 (1714). Provision for military force was made, simultane-
ously and by way of important contrast, for dealing with insurrections or rebellions; see
19831
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Hale reiterated the rule that military measures cannot be coun-
tenanced in domestic civil affairs so long as the institutions of
civil law remain operable.2 Blackstone, whose great influence
upon lawyers in the new American nation is well known, on the
eve of American independence had also affirmed the principle
that military force could never be used so long as civil courts
could function."'
The congressional debates on the 1792 bill which became
the antecedent of 10 U.S.C. section 331 make it plain that this
rule was very much on the minds of that early Congress;" and
American courts have continued to adhere to the rule. 5 Only a
handful of "insurrections" within the intended meaning of this
statute have been experienced in American history; for example,
the Civil War (1861-1865), Shay's Rebellion (1786-1787), the
Whiskey Rebellion (1794), the Dorr Rebellion (1842), and the
civil war in the Territory of Kansas (1856).
The statute now codified as 10 U.S.C. section 331 was care-
fully and deliberately crafted by Congress to apply only in such
extreme situations, where the civilian legal institutions of states
had been routed by outright rebellion. The term "insurrection"
was used for this reason, to preserve the traditional legal prohi-
bition against any use of military force in lesser situations.
There is no authority under this statute for any use of military
resources to deal with mere riots or civil disorders, however
severe.
However, it has become common to cite this statute as if it
were authority for sending federal troops into requesting states
where nothing really resembling insurrection is present, merely
to suppress riots or other violations of state laws." In 1968, the
supra note 38 and accompanying text.
62. 1 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 34-36 (4th ed. C. Runnington 1792).
63. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS Op ENGLAND 152 (1765).
64. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 574-77 (1792).
65. For a survey of cases, see Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution, supra note 14, at 67,
n.319.
66. For example, after the urban riots experienced in several cities during the sum-
mer of 1967, United States Attorney General Ramsey Clark on August 7, 1967, sent a
letter to the governors of all of the states, referring to 10 U.S.C. § 331 as authority for
the use of federal troops, at state request, in such instances of "serious 'domestic vio-
lence' "; the text of the letter is reproduced in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 3 n.2 (1972).
The origin of this profound statutory misconstruction is to be found in the period
during and after the Civil War. Although the following explanation will not be clear to
the reader until the historical and legislative developments have been more fully
examined in the pages which follow, it seems appropriate to summarize the explanation
[Vol. 7:1
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National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in its Official
Report recommended that 10 U.S.C. section 331 be amended to
remove the doubts of legality attending such use of federal
troops in the absence of real insurrection. 7 No such amendment
has ever been enacted by Congress; and even if it were, amend-
ing the statute could not alter the constitutional prohibition,
respect for which led the Congress originally to draft this statute
as it did. Nevertheless, 10 U.S.C. section 331 is cited as one pur-
ported legal basis for the Civil Disturbance Regulations. The
misconception that this statute can be invoked to deal with riots
or disorders, as distinguished from insurrections or rebellions, is
one of the foundations for military intervention in the United
States.
B. 10 U.S.C. § 332
Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstruc-
tions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the
authority of the United States, make it impracticable to
enforce the laws of the United States in any State or Territory
by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into
here. The sharp demarcation between insurrection and mere riot or disorder, drawn by
Congress in the 1792 legislation, was blurred by Congress in 1861 when in the heat of
wartime passion it radically revised a companion section of the 1792 Act. See infra text
accompanying notes 68-98. Ten years later, still enamored of military efficiency, Con-
gress passed a new statute which also ignores the distinction. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 99-130. Neither of those nineteenth century statutes could survive constitu-
tional analysis if the constitutional rule which prompted Congress to draft the 1792
legislation as it did were applied; but neither has ever been judicially tested. Since those
later measures are codified together with the surviving provision of the 1792 Act, it has
been easy for lawyers reading the three provisions as they appear in the Code, without
any awareness of the history, to assume (wrongly) that the word "insurrection" was used
by the 1792 Congress no more precisely than it was in the Radical (and unconstitutional)
legislation during and after the Civil War.
Until 1878, it had been possible, under a subtle but important doctrinal distinction,
to use federal military personnel in a non-military capacity to control civil disorders. See
infra text accompanying notes 72-80. When that was made unlawful in 1878 (see infra
text accompanying notes 148-62), instead of concluding that civil disorders as distin-
guished from real insurrections must be suppressed by civilian forces the executive
branch began to interpret the term "insurrection" in the surviving remnant of the 1792
Act so broadly as to include even "petty attempts to resist or evade the laws." 3 DItAY
AND LErrEs or RUTHERPORD B. HAYES 492-93 (1929). See also 16 Op. Att'y Gen. 162
(1878); 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 242 (1881); 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 333 (1882); 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 292
(1889); 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 368 (1889).
Thus, the misconstruction of the term "insurrection" in 10 U.S.C. § 331 is one of
long standing.
67. REPORT OF TH NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CivIL DISORDERS 288 (Gov't
Print. Office 1968).
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Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of
the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those
laws or to suppress the rebellion.
This statute derives from a separate section of the 1792
statute already discussed; but it was profoundly altered by
amendment during the era of the Civil War. Section 2 of the
1792 Act provided:
That whenever the laws of the United States shall be
opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed, in any state, by
combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the
marshals by [section 9 of] this act .... it shall be lawful for
the President of the United States to call forth the militia of
such state to suppress such combinations, and to cause the
[federal] laws to be duly executed. s
After the development of standing federal armed forces, an 1807
amendment to this section of the 1792 Act authorized the Presi-
dent to use federal troops as well as state militia in such
circumstances. 9
In contrast to section 1 of the 1792 Act, from which derives
10 U.S.C. section 331 discussed earlier, this section 2 of the 1792
Act did concern the enforcement of federal law. It will be recal-
led from that earlier discussion that the unacceptable proposal
deleted a few weeks earlier from the Senate version of the so-
called Militia Bill had attempted to treat execution of the laws
of the Union, suppression of insurrections, and repulsion of
invasion all together in the same terms."0 When the Congress set
its hand to what became the 1792 Act, it dealt with insurrection
and invasion in one section, and dealt separately with the execu-
tion of federal laws. The reason it did so, however, was far more
than a draftsman's whim.
The terms of section 2 of the 1792 Act quite clearly contem-
plated the use of troops to execute federal laws as a distinc-
68. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264. The 1792 Act by its terms was
limited in duration to three years. The Act which took its place in 1795, while varying a
few details of wording, made no material change of substance. Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch.
36, § 2, 1 Stat. 424. Because no material changes were introduced, the 1795 Act was
essentially a reenactment of the 1792 Act, but not limited in duration. For convenience,
therefore, the text of this article refers throughout to "the 1792 Act" even when what is
meant, were it stated more precisely, is the 1795 Act which took its place.
69. Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443; see supra note 50.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
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tively military force, under no civilian officer other than the
President as Commander-in-Chief. If this had been all that the
section made provision for, however, it would have authorized
precisely what nearly six centuries of legal tradition (distilled
into the fifth amendment due process guarantee ratified just a
year earlier, in 1791) had forbidden: the option of the executive
to enforce the laws by military force rather than by civilian mea-
sures. The recorded debates make it clear that quite the oppo-
site was intended: the other phrases of section 2 are crucial to its
meaning, and also explain why it was necessary to deal with this
most sensitive matter of federal law enforcement separately
from, and more elaborately than, the situations covered by sec-
tion 1.
Section 2 authorized the President to use military force to
execute laws only when they were opposed or obstructed "by
combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the
marshals by this act. . . ." This language was absent from the
bill as it was originally introduced. Vigorous debate was aroused
by the original language, and several members denounced the
original language as much too indulgent of the use of military
force.7 1 Their heated denunciations spawned several amend-
ments to the bill. These amendments not only added the above-
quoted language to section 2, but also added a separate section
(section 9) regarding the powers of federal marshals. Only by
examining this separate added section can the scope of the
authority conferred by section 2 be correctly understood.
Section 9 of the 1792 Act declared that federal marshals and
their deputies have "the same powers in executing the laws of
the United States, as sheriffs and their deputies in the several
states have by law in executing the laws of their respective
states. ' '7 ' If there were no ready explanation for the inclusion of
this provision regarding marshals, it would seem anomalous in a
statute concerned with the use of military resources. It would
also seem superfluous, because the Judiciary Act of 1789 had
already given federal marshals "power to command all necessary
assistance in the execution of [their] duty. ' 73 There is, however,
an explanation which reveals that section 9 of the Act was
71. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 574-77 (1792).
72. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 9, 1 Stat. 264-65.
73. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87.
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neither anomalous or superfluous, but was of paramount impor-
tance, and is indispensable to understanding section 2. This sig-
nificance of section 9, however, cannot be perceived by a modern
reader unaware of a crucial doctrine first articulated in 1780 by
England's Lord Chief Justice Mansfield-a doctrine which
became a fundamental premise of American law.
British troops ("Redcoats") had been employed to suppress
rioters in London during the highly destructive Lord Gordon
Riots in June, 1780. 7 4 Afterwards, Lords and Members of Parlia-
ment, aware of the English tradition forbidding military force in
domestic affairs, debated whether this use of troops had been
lawful. Responding to those who denounced it as reminiscent of
the so-called "martial law" prerogative employed by the Tudors
and Stuarts, Lord Mansfield rose to justify the utilization of the
troops.
The Chief Justice justified the use of "Redcoats" by draw-
ing an essential legal distinction between their utilization in a
military capacity, as a distinctively military force, and the utili-
zation of those same organized units of troops in a civilian
capacity, in the nature of the posse comitatus. He explained:
I presume it is known ... that every individual, in his pri-
vate capacity, may lawfully interfere to suppress a riot ....
Not only is he authorized to interfere for such a purpose, but it
is his duty to do so; and, if called upon by a magistrate, he is
punishable in case of refusal. What any single individual may
lawfully do for the prevention of crime and preservation of the
public peace, may be done by any number assembled to per-
form their duty as good citizens. It is the peculiar business of
all constables to apprehend rioters, to endeavor to disperse all
unlawful assemblies, and, in case of resistance, to attack,
wound, nay, kill those who continue to resist;-taking care not
to commit unnecessary violence, or to abuse the power legally
vested in them....
The persons who assisted in the suppression of these
tumults are to be considered mere private individuals acting as
duty required. My Lords, we have not been living under mar-
tial law .... Supposing a soldier, or any other military person,
who acted in the course of the late riots, had exceeded the
powers with which he was invested, I have not a single doubt
74. See Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution, supra note 14, at 31-32. For further
accounts of the Lord Gordon Riots, see 3 J. CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES
OF ENGLAND 402-21 (3d ed. 1874); Proceedings Against Lord George Gordon, 21 State
Trials 485 (1781); Rex v. Kennett, 172 Eng. Rep. 976 (1781).
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that he may be punished, not by a court-martial, but upon an
indictment ...
The King's extraordinary prerogative to proclaim martial
law (whatever that may be) is clearly out of the question ...
The military have been called in-and very wisely called
in-not as soldiers, but as citizens. No matter whether their
coats be red or brown, they were employed, not to subvert, but
to preserve, the laws and constitution which we all prize so
highly. 8
As a result of Henry II's Assize of Arms in the twelfth cen-
tury, a decree of Henry III and the Statute of Winchester in the
thirteenth century, and the emergence of the Court of Constable
and Marshal in the fourteenth century, the same citizens who
for some purposes were a military force under a special system
of discipline and specialized tribunals were also, regardless of
that other role, subject to call by the sheriff or other civil officers
as the posse comitatus under common law obligation enforced
by civilian courts.70  Lord Mansfield's Doctrine adapted that
ancient duality of character to a more modern day."
75. 21 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 688-98 (W. Cobbett ed. 1814).
Mansfield's doctrine was applied in Rex v. Kennett, 172 Eng. Rep. 976, 984 (1781), and
again in Rex v. Pinney, 172 Eng. Rep. 962, 967 n.(b) (1832).
76. See Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution, supra note 14, at 2-5.
77. Pye & Lowell, supra note 14, at 666-67, suggest that the main point of Lord
Mansfield's thesis was to justify the use of troops at the instance of the King and under
their officer's orders, rather than at the instance and direction of local magistrates,
though they note the "ambiguity of his language." On a more careful reading of Mans-
field's argument, however, there is no ambiguity. His thesis was that citizens have a duty
to interfere to suppress riots or felonies, even if not called upon by a magistrate,
although only if disobedient to such a call could their neglect of that duty be punished.
Although not called by the local magistrates, who defaulted in their own responsibility
(see Rex v. Kennett, 172 Eng. Rep. 976 (1781)), these troops "as citizens" had responded
to that duty; that they had been prompted to do so by the King or their military superi-
ors was quite accidental. Mansfield made no suggestion that the troops could have disre-
garded instructions of the magistrates had the magistrates undertaken to instruct them.
The contrary was in fact implied by Mansfield's insistence that they were civilians, not
soldiers, and were acting as a posse and not military instruments of the Crown. That,
indeed, was the point of Mansfield's observation that any Tudor-Stuart "martial law"
prerogative to supersede regular civil authority was "clearly out of the question." 21 THE
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 698 (W. Cobbett ed. 1814).
It may be that in later years in England Lord Mansfield's doctrine came to be relied
upon as authority for royal rather than local employment of troops; but that was not the
significance that the Americans gave to his doctrine. To them, Mansfield's point was that
soldiers could be used to suppress civil disorder and execute law-by whomever they
might be called-only as civilians and never as a military force at all; and ordinarily they
would be called upon for such duty by civil officials more responsible than those whose
default in the face of the Lord Gordon Riots had made necessary an invocation from the
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By virtue of this Mansfield Doctrine, sheriffs in the states,
having the power of sheriffs at common law to use the posse to
execute state laws, could call out militiamen in a civilian capac-
ity, even though organized in their militia units, as part of their
posse. The purpose of section 9 of the 1792 Act, the congres-
sional debates make quite clear, was to affirm that federal mar-
shals could do the same for purposes of executing federal laws.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 had indeed authorized marshals "to
command all necessary assistance," but nothing in the 1789 con-
gressional materials had made it clear that this was specifically
to include militia units as civilians in accordance with the Mans-
field Doctrine. The legislative history of section 9 of the 1792
Act, by contrast, makes it clear that this was precisely what the
new provision was intended to do.
In 1792 there were no standing regular federal armed forces,
so the immediate impact of section 9 was to make certain that
marshals, like sheriffs in the states, could call up state mili-
tiamen as their civilian posse to execute the laws. 8 Within a few
years, however, a modest regular standing federal army had
become established. Those regular soldiers were then commonly
used by the marshals as civilians even though organized in regu-
lar army units, in situations of unrest, riot or disorder where it
was well understood that their use as a military force would
have been impermissible.
Thus it was proper, pursuant to section 9 of the 1792 Act, to
use federal troops as a civilian force to suppress riots and other-
wise to enforce federal laws, while it was clearly understood that
their use in such situations as a military force would be unlaw-
ful.7 9 The resulting practice, and its basis in the Mansfield Doc-
Crown.
78. Pye & Lowell, supra note 14, at 688, assert with reference to §2 of the 1792 Act,
see supra note 68, "[i]f Congress had intended that federal marshals should draft a state
militia into federal service as a posse before a state militia could be called into federal
service by the President, it presumably would have said so. It did not .. " On the
contrary, however, Congress did say so, in terms quite sufficiently clear to the minds of
1792; and that is exactly the practice that was thereafter followed for more than sixty
years, see infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. Again, ignoscunt ut ignarent.
79. An equivalent practice was followed in the states. See, e.g., Ela v. Smith, 71
Mass. (5 Gray) 121, 143 (1855).
An Act of Congress, Act of March 3, 1807, ch. 46, 2 Stat. 445, pertaining to the newly
acquired and largely unsettled territories outside the boundaries of any state, authorized
the President "to direct the marshal, or officer acting as marshal," and "employ such
military force as he may judge necessary and proper," to remove squatters from federally
owned lands within those unorganized territories. It is important to understand what
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trine, was confirmed by the Attorney General of the United
States in an 1854 Opinion, declaring:
[Tihe posse comitatus comprises every person in the district or
county above the age of fifteen years, (Watson's sheriff, p. 60),
whatever may be their occupation, whether civilians or not;
and including the military of all denominations, militia,
soldiers, marines, all of whom are alike bound to obey the com-
mands of a sheriff or marshal. The fact that they are organized
had precipitated this legislation. By presidential address as well as common publications
the Congress had been informed of the enterprise of former Vice-President Aaron Burr,
collecting a following of Westerners from along the Ohio to settle a large expanse of the
newly acquired Louisiana territory, to secede from the Union and establish a government
under Burr, and then perhaps to "liberate" Mexico and Texas from Spain. Burr himself
had been captured near the end of 1806, and would be tried for treason in May, 1807;
but many of his followers were in the process of establishing themselves in the Louisiana
countryside. The regular troops of the Union then numbered some 3,200 men, in addi-
tion to a corps of engineers; and most of these were stationed at New Orleans, where
some discomforting boundary altercations with the Spanish had occurred. After exten-
sive debate discussing both the Spanish issue and what was denominated as the "insur-
rection" in the West (meaning Burr's design for secession and sovereignty), see 9 ANNALS
OF CONG. 332-33, 362-73 (1807), a bill originating in the Senate to almost double the size
of the Army was postponed indefinitely in the House. Id. at 681. That indefinite post-
ponement came the day after the House, after some heated debate, had approved the
measure (mentioned above) authorizing military force to oust squatters from federal
lands.
The debate on the squatter measure, id. at 664-72, had emphasized the matter of
the "insurrection" in Louisiana to such an extent that opponents of the measure criti-
cized it as "a general law, made to suit a particular case," id. at 688; see also id. at 669-
70. The squatter measure, however, did not mandate military force; it also authorized
ouster by "the marshal, or officer acting as marshal." The refusal to enlarge the Army,
therefore, meant that with the armed forces concentrated at New Orleans it was only in
Louisiana, as a practical matter, that the ouster of squatters might be accomplished by
military force; and there, if the information before Congress was correct, the squatters
embroiled in the Burr conspiracy were indeed in insurrection against the United States.
It is significant that supporters of the squatter measure, for precedent for such authori-
zation of military force, cited the 1794 military suppression of the Whiskey Rebellion, a
clear case of insurrection; see id. at 666.
The squatter measure became law the same day as the amendment to the 1792 Act
making it lawful for the President to use regular troops as well as militia only to put
down insurrections, those assaults upon government authority which civilian measures
had proven unable to suppress, see supra note 51. Given the substance of the legislative
debates, the refusal to enlarge the Army, and the primacy of concern over the Louisiana
situation with the followers of Burr, it would be quite unhistorical to attribute to the
1807 Congress an intent to overthrow the due process tradition and provide for military
as an alternative to civilian force even in the absence of insurrection. Even if, under the
letter of the squatter measure, military troops might be used elsewhere than in Louisi-
ana, it was only to be in the relatively unsettled territories, where viable civil government
had yet to be established; and even then, it was probably not intended to disturb the
expectation that the alternative of ouster by "the marshal, or officer acting as marshal,"
must have priority.
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as military bodies, under the immediate command of their own
officers, does not in any wise affect their legal character. They
are still the posse comitatus. (xxi Parl. Hist., p. 672, 688, per
Lord Mansfield.)80
It is only in the light of this practice authorized by section 9
of the 1792 Act that the import of section 2 of that same Act can
be understood. Section 2 did indeed contemplate the utilization
of troops as a distinctively military force; but it allowed this
intrusion of military force only in circumstances where the resis-
tance to federal law was "too powerful to be suppressed" by
civilian means-including the use of military personnel as a
civilian force under the command of federal marshals pursuant
to section 9 of the 1792 Act.
Two other provisions added by amendment during debate
over the 1792 Act serve to emphasize the interplay between sec-
tions 9 and 2, and the extreme circumstances contemplated by
the latter. The first of these required that, before troops could
be used pursuant to section 2, the incompetence of judicial pro-
ceedings and the failure of the marshals acting under section 9
must be "notified to the President of the United States, by an
associate justice or the district judge.""1 The other, applying
alike to circumstances under section 2 and under section 1 (dis-
cussed earlier), required that when the President deemed it nec-
essary to use such military force he must "previous thereto, by
proclamation, command such insurgents to disperse, and retire
peaceably to their respective abodes, within a limited time. '82 It
was only the President personally who was so empowered, and
then only as to "insurgents" who had disabled the judicial pro-
cess and overpowered the marshals and posse and still refused to
disperse.
In other words, section 2 of the 1792 Act, while not utilizing
the word "insurrection," contemplated circumstances equivalent
80. 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 466, 473 (1854). Pye & Lowell, supra note 14, at 689 n.361,
suggest that the practice of using troops as a posse might have originated with this
"ingenious" Attorney General's Opinion in 1854. An opinion by a subsequent Attorney
General, however, 16 Op. Att'y Gen. 162 (1878), quoted infra note 162, affirms the histo-
ricity of the practice.
81. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 3, 1 Stat. 264. This clause was deleted when the
1792 Act was repealed and substantially reenacted shortly after the Whiskey Rebellion,
Act of Feb. 22, 1795, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 424. See supra note 68.
82. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 3, 1 Stat. 264 (emphasis added). This provision was
included again in the 1795 Act, Act of February 22, 1795, ch. 36, § 3, 1 Stat. 424, see
supra note 68. It survives as 10 U.S.C. § 334 (1976).
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to those contemplated by section 1 but involving assaults upon
federal rather than upon state authority: rebellions specifically
against established civil authority, disrupting "the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings,"83 which civilian federal officials,
even by exhausting their resources (including troops employed
under the Mansfield Doctrine as a civilian posse), could not
suppress.
So understood, section 2 of the 1792 Act, in authorizing dis-
tinctively military force, was quite consistent with the rule,
adopted from the English tradition and newly constitutionalized
in the fifth amendment guaranty of civilian due process, which
prohibited the use of distinctively military force against civilians
except when civil government was under such assault that civil-
ian institutions were incapacitated.
By the time of the Civil War, however, demands for open
military action to settle great national issues had caused politi-
cians as well as the public to become impatient with such subtle
distinctions as that on which the Mansfield Doctrine relied. The
previously familiar difference between "civilian" and "military"
utilization of soldiers was no longer perceived. President
Buchanan in 1860 used a confused misapprehension of the tradi-
tional practice as his excuse for refusing to send federal troops
to suppress the spreading insurrection in the South. Referring to
the practice of using troops as a posse to assist federal civilian
officials, he asserted that it was of no avail because the federal
civilian officials had been driven out of the dissident states."
Actually, of course, Buchanan was faced with a clear case of
insurrection against the national government, to deal with which
avowedly military force was plainly authorized, and to which the
civilian posse use of troops had no proper application.
When Lincoln became President, he promptly discarded
Buchanan's inhibitions; but he did more than send the army and
navy against the insurgents in the South. Lincoln also undertook
various distinctively military measures against civilians in the
loyal states. Soldiers proceeded throughout the North to arrest
persons suspected of disloyalty or espionage, confining many
without trial in military prisons for indefinite terms. Mobs pro-
83. This phrase from the Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264, corresponds to
the traditional criterion of "insurrection": closure of civil courts. See supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
84. 5 J. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PESI-
DENTS 634 (1897).
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testing the draft or the arrests of deserters were suppressed by
troops. Lincoln decreed that draft resisters and persons "afford-
ing aid and comfort to rebels" were to be subject to martial law
and tried by courts martial. More than 13,000 persons were
arrested and confined by military authority in the North. Lin-
coln's Attorney General, Edward Bates, in a remarkable opinion
delivered to the President within four months of his inaugura-
tion, had provided the rationale on which these outrages were
defended.85 Bates's opinion asserted that the President had
inherent power "to use the army to aid him in the performance
of" his duty "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed." '
Although he asserted that this power was inherent and that the
doctrine of separation of powers placed it beyond judicial or leg-
islative restraint, Bates viewed the statutes derived from the
1792 Act as recognizing and aiding it.87 The distinction between
the use of troops as civilians and their use as a military force
was either forgotten or ignored; although Bates paid lip service
to the requirement that the military be subordinate to the civil
power, he regarded it as sufficient compliance with that precept
that the President as Commander-in-Chief "is a civil magistrate,
not a military chief.' ' "
It was this thesis of Bates, upon which Lincoln had acted,
that was denounced and repudiated not only in Ex parte Milli-
gan89 but also in other cases, by both federal and state courts."
Those judicial declamations, however, came only later, in the
slow course of litigation. To Congress, then composed only of
Northern representatives, fevered by the internecine war with
the South, and looking to the Union Army for the very survival
of the nation as well as the triumph of a great moral cause, it
was not a time for respecting such constraints. While Congress
would not endorse a presidential power to flout congressional
directives, the Congress by legislation would grant vast latitude
to this trusted executive. Orke of the measures enacted during
those frenzied first few months of Civil War-within four weeks
85. 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 74 (1861).
86. Id. at 79.
87. Id. at 80, 83.
88. Id. at 79.
89. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); see supra text accompanying notes 3-6.
90. E.g., Johnson v. Jones, 44 IMI. 142, 160-61 (1867); Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370,
388-89 (1863). See also In re Egan, 8 F. Cas. 367 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 4,303); Mini-
gan v. Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 380, 381 (C.C.D. Ind. 1871) (No. 9,605).
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after the date of Attorney General Bates's radical opinion, and
like that opinion blending confused misapprehension of estab-
lished legal doctrine with extreme determination to eliminate
opposition and enforce the national will by any expedient
means-was a revision of section 2 of the 1792 Act, concerning
use of the military to enforce federal law.
What survives today as 10 U.S.C. section 332 is the sub-
stance of that 1861 revision of the language that had been so
carefully crafted in 1792 to preserve the constitutional standard.
As the changes wrought by this 1861 Act 9' are considered, it
should be borne in mind that this Act (which survives as 10
U.S.C. section 332) has never been subjected to judicial scrutiny.
The 1861 Act eliminated the requirement of the prior legis-
lation that, before distinctively military force could be
employed, the powers vested in federal marshals must first be
shown insufficient.9 2 It was this requirement, premised upon the
Mansfield Doctrine, that had contemplated a civilian force of
military personnel employed as a marshal's posse,93 and limited
distinctively military measures to situations when that civilian
federal force was overpowered. To the minds of a Congress at
war, however, soldiers were soldiers, and nothing else. The sub-
tlety of the Mansfield Doctrine was beyond their understanding.
They therefore eliminated from the statute what theretofore had
been a crucial element of its constitutional validity, and a safe-
guard of the civilian due process tradition.
Moreover, whereas the prior legislation had allowed
recourse to military force only to deal with "combinations too
powerful to be suppressed" by judicial proceedings and the mar-
shals with their posse," the 1861 Act invited such recourse
"whenever . . . it shall become impracticable, in the judgment
of the President," to rely upon the ordinary course of judicial
91. Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, 12 Stat. 281.
92. Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, § 1, 12 Stat. 281. Cf. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 2,
1 Stat. 264; Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 424.
93. The 1861 Act did contain, as § 7, a provision equivalent to § 9 of the Act of May
2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264, providing that marshals should have the same powers as
sheriffs in executing the laws. However, by eliminating the requirement that the
resources of the marshal be exhausted prior to use of the military as such, the 1861 Act
reduced this provision (originally designed to affirm the posse comitatus use of military
personnel by marshals) to a superfluous redundancy; see supra text accompanying notes
72-83. Section 9 of the 1792 Act had been crucial and integral to the scheme of that
statute; but § 7 of the 1861 Act had no significance because the scheme of the statute
had been radically changed, and it survived like a useless appendix.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
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proceedings to enforce federal laws. 5 Instead of necessity, the
statutory criterion for military intervention had now become
convenience. With the traditional posse use of troops as civilians
forgotten, and no other federal civilian force of significant man-
power available, "impracticability" or convenience as a criterion
virtually assured that there would now be military intervention
in situations where it would not have been allowable before."
The new Civil Disturbance Regulations rely upon 10 U.S.C.
section 332, essentially unchanged since the 1861 Act, as one
authority for the measures of military intervention they contem-
plate.Y This statute could not survive judicial scrutiny under
the Constitution if established principles of historic due process
were applied. The statute has escaped invalidation only because
there has never been occasion for it to be judicially reviewed.
Without any constitutional footing, it remains as another foun-
dation for military intervention in the United States."
C. 10 U.S.C. § 333
The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or
both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he
considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection,
domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it-
(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that state,
95. Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, § 1, 12 Stat. 281.
96. The Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, § 2, 12 Stat. 282, retained the requirement of a
presidential proclamation, and as in the 1792 Act the proclamation was to be one com-
manding "such insurgents" to disperse; but given the radical changes in the scope of
circumstances to which the Act could be applied after 1861 it was no longer possible to
treat this antecedent of 10 U.S.C. § 332 as contemplating only such events as would have
been regarded as "insurrections" by the draftsmen of 1792. Instead of being limited to
"combinations too powerful to be suppressed" by civilian means, the scope of the statute
now included "assemblages of persons" by reason of which the President thought it
"impracticable" to rely upon civilian means. In marked contrast to the rule insisted
upon, for constitutional reasons, by the ,1792 draftsmen, it now had been provided that
the military could be used as an option even in mere riots or disorders which involved
none of the traditional indicia of insurrection-armed assault on the institutions of gov-
ernment, rendering civil institutions inoperative.
By retaining the reference to "insurgents" in the proclamation section while so radi-
cally expanding the scope of circumstances covered, the 1861 Act contributed to the
broadened and fundamentally mistaken interpretation of the word "insurrection" that is
used even in 10 U.S.C. § 331, and thus helped to foster the notion that § 331 is available
for dealing with mere riots; see supra note 66.
97. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c)(2)(i)(B) (1981). So also do the 1968 Regulations, see 32
C.F.R. § 187.4(c)(2) (1971).
98. It is well within the power of Congress to provide for a civilian force either to
execute federal laws or to suppress violence at the request of states; see infra note 163.
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and of the United States within the State, that any part
or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege,
immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and
secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that
State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, priv-
ilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of
the United States or impedes the course of justice under
those laws.
In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be con-
sidered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured
by the Constitution.
This statute originated with the efforts of Reconstruction
Era Radicals to suppress at all costs the die-hard Southern resis-
tance to the social consequences of the Civil War. It was origi-
nally enacted as section 3 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871."'
The sequence of the several clauses, and in some relatively insig-
nificant respects the substance, have been modified since 1871;
but the essential content of what is now codified as 10 U.S.C.
section 333 has remained unchanged. For comparison, the lan-
guage of the 1871 Act is set out in the footnote below.100
It is important to place this 1871 enactment in historical
context. The Civil War had ended in April, 1865. In some van-
quished confederate states even before the end of the war, and
99. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 3, 17 Stat. 13, 14.
100. That in all cases where insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combina-
tions, or conspiracies in any State shall so obstruct or hinder the execution of
the laws thereof, and of the United States, so as to deprive any portion or class
of the people of such State of any of the rights, privileges, or immunities, or
protection, named in the Constitution and secured by this act, and the consti-
tuted authorities of such State shall either be unable to protect, or shall, from
any cause, fail in or refuse protection of the people in such rights, such facts
shall be deemed a denial by such State of the equal protection of the laws to
which they are entitled under the Constitution of the United States; and in all
such cases, or whenever any such insurrection, violence, unlawful combination,
or conspiracy shall oppose or obstruct the laws of the United States or the due
execution thereof, or impede or obstruct the due course of justice under the
same, it shall be lawful for the President, and it shall be his duty to take mea-
sures, by the employment of the militia or the land and naval forces of the
United States, or either, or by other means, as he may deem necessary for the
suppression of such insurrection, domestic violence, or combinations; and any
person who shall be arrested under the provisions of this and the preceding
section shall be delivered to the marshal of the proper district, to be dealt with
according to law.
Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 3, 17 Stat. 13, 14.
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in all such states except Texas within six months after, new
civilian governments under new or amended state constitutions
had been elected and installed. There were Radicals in Congress,
however, who opposed the presidential plan of reconstruction
under which these post-war civilian governments had been
established. By the end of 1865, these Radicals had become the
dominant force.
None of the new governments in the formerly secessionist
states had granted blacks the right to vote, and all but Tennes-
see had enacted statutes quite discriminatory against blacks.
Outrage at what Northerners regarded as an unrepentant atti-
tude on the part of Southern whites, together with concern for
assuring Republican dominance in national politics, brought
more and more members of Congress into the Radical camp.
The Radicals were not yet ready to put aside the distinc-
tively military means with which the war itself had been won. In
February, 1866, Congress passed a bill to enlarge the scope of
the Freedmen's Bureau, which had been created within the War
Department a year before. The bill provided that any person in
the former secessionist states accused of infringing the rights of
a former slave would be triable by a military tribunal, or an
agent of the Freedmen's Bureau in accordance with martial law.
President Johnson, however, vetoed that flagrantly unconstitu-
tional measure. 101 A second Freedmen's Bureau bill, somewhat
more moderate but still providing for military protection and
military jurisdiction regarding freedmen's rights, was enacted
over Johnson's veto four months later.102
In the meantime, in April Congress had enacted (also over a
presidential veto) the Civil Rights Act of 1866.13 That benefi-
cent legislation was marred by two provisions which counte-
nanced military action to enforce its terms. The first authorized
process servers appointed pursuant to the Act to "summon and
call to their aid" not only the posse comitatus, but also "such
portion of the land or naval forces of the United States, or of the
militia, as may be necessary to the performance of the duty with
which they are charged, and to insure a faithful observance of
the clause of the Constitution which prohibits slavery. . .."104
101. President Johnson's veto message appears at CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 915-17 (1866).
102. Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173.
103. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
104. Id. at § 5.
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The second provided:
That it shall be lawful for the President of the United
States, or such person as he may empower for that purpose, to
employ such part of the land or naval forces of the United
States, or of the militia, as shall be necessary to prevent the
violation and enforce the due execution of this act.10'
These distinctively military measures were authorized by Con-
gress even though federal civilian authority was fully established
at that time in all of the formerly secessionist states. There were
indeed incidents of violence and intimidation against black citi-
zens, which certainly warranted federal intervention; but there
was nowhere any such assault upon civilian institutions as would
have justified that intervention being military in character.
The text of what two years later would be ratified as the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution was approved by
Congress in mid-1866; but the legislatures of ten of the Southern
states refused to ratify it. Incensed at this rejection by the
southern post-war civil governments, the Radicals in Congress
now determined upon their most sweeping militaristic moves.
They enacted the Military Reconstruction Act in March, 1867,16
on the articulated premise that no legal civilian governments
existed in those states. That Act established five military dis-
tricts comprehending the ten states in question, each to be gov-
erned under martial law by a commanding army general with an
ample force of troops. The Act gave these military commanders
discretion whether to try offenders in military tribunals or to
allow trials by the established local civilian courts. Even on the
dubious premise that no civilian state governments existed,
there was no basis for denying that civilian federal authority
had been reestablished in those states since the war had ended
almost two years before. There was no colorable constitutional
justification, therefore, for making the reconstruction presence
of the federal government military in form.
The Military Reconstruction Act was passed over President
Johnson's veto; and having doubts therefore about the Presi-
dent's will to execute it, Congress ordained that all orders
regarding military operations, even if issued by the President,
were void unless issued through the "general of the army,"
105. Id. at § 9.
106. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428.
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whom they ordained could not be removed or relieved of com-
mand without Senate approval. 10 7 "General of the Army" was a
rank which Congress had authorized seven months earlier for a
sole incumbent to be appointed with advice and consent of the
Senate, "to command the armies of the United States."' 8 Gen-
eral Ulysses S. Grant had been appointed. The earlier Act had
provided that the General of the Army should serve "under the
direction and during the pleasure of the President;" by the later
provision immunizing him from presidential removal and requir-
ing all orders regarding military operations to be issued through
him, however, Congress effectively placed General Grant rather
than the President in control of reconstruction.
Under Grant's command the military district commanders
ousted thousands of local civilian officials and six state gover-
nors, appointing others in their places. State legislation was set
aside or modified by military decrees. The army purged the leg-
islatures of at least three states. A distinctively military force of
some 20,000 soldiers was the primary peacekeeping force, aided
by militia of blacks organized by the federal military com-
manders after Congress had declared the states' own militias
disbanded. 09 Any doubts as to whether such military overthrow
of civilian governments was within Congress's intention were
eliminated four months later when Congress amended the origi-
nal Reconstruction Act to ratify and explicitly authorize what
had been done," 0 and to further provide that "no district com-
mander .. .or any of the officers or appointees acting under
them, shall be bound in his action by any opinion of any civil
officer of the United States."'
No one expected that such blatant intrusions of military
force into civil affairs, such suspension of civilian authority by
military authority, could be upheld as constitutional by any civil
court. General Grant himself said of the Reconstruction legisla-
tion: "Much of it, no doubt, was unconstitutional; but it was
hoped that the laws enacted would serve their purpose before
the question of constitutionality could be submitted to the judi-
ciary and a decision obtained."
12
107. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 170, § 2, 14 Stat. 486-87.
108. Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 232, 14 Stat. 223.
109. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 170, § 6, 14 Stat. 487.
110. Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, §§ 2, 4, 15 Stat. 14, 15.
111. Id. at § 10, 15 Stat. at 16.
112. Quoted in MomsoN, COMMAGER & LEUCHTENBURG, A CONcisE HISTORY OF THE
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Indeed, the Military Reconstruction Act had been enacted
only four months after the Supreme Court, in Ex parte Milli-
gan, a case arising out of actions taken in a Northern state dur-
ing the war itself, had vigorously reaffirmed the established con-
stitutional rule. The Court had said:
If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually
closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice
according to law, then, on the theater of active military opera-
tions, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a
substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve
the safety of the army and society; and as no power is left but
the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the
laws can have their free course. As necessity creates the Rule,
so it limits its duration; for, if this government is continued
after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of
power. Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open,
and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdic-
tion. It is also confined to the locality of actual war."s
At least one lower federal court had held that where a post-war
civilian government had been established (in South Carolina) a
civilian could not be tried for a crime by court martial.1 ' To
prevent further embarrassment by judicial opinions denouncing
the obviously illegal measures the Radicals were determined to
pursue, Congress ordained that "no civil court of the United
States, or of any state, or of the District of Columbia, or of any
district or territory of the United States, shall have or take juris-
diction of" any case arising out of military actions taken
between the date of President Lincoln's inauguration and July 1,
1866, a date fifteen months after the end of the war.113
AumcAN REPuBLic 344 (1977).
113. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866).
114. In re Egan, 8 F. Cas. 367 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 4,303).
115. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 155, 14 Stat. 432. The constitutionality of this brazen
attempt to foreclose all judicial inquiry was more than a little dubious.. The Act was
ignored by the circuit courts, and did not prevent relief in damages for Lambdin Milli-
gan against the military personnel who had unconstitutionally (see supra note 113) con-
fined him; Milligan v. Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 380 (C.C.D. Ind. 1871) (No. 9,605). The Supreme
Court never faced the necessity of ruling on the validity of this purported jurisdictional
foreclosure. The only occasion when it was invited to do so was in Beckwith v. Bean, 98
U.S. 266 (1878), where the circuit court's disregard of the 1867 jurisdiction divesting
statute was one of the points of purported error relied upon by the Attorney General in
seeking reversal of a damage judgment rendered by the circuit court for a wartime arrest
in Vermont. The majority of the Supreme Court found that a different error, equally
relied upon, necessitated reversal, and noted, "We express no opinion as to the construc-
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In shameless defiance of constitutional law, military recon-
struction proceeded apace. Twice in the first months after the
process began, states sought to have the 1867 legislation invali-
dated by the Supreme Court; but their requests for injunctions
against executive action to preserve rights of sovereignty were
beyond the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.11
A proper case putting in issue the constitutionality of the Mili-
tary Reconstruction Act soon arose, however, when a person
held prisoner by the military district commander in Mississippi
sought release by writ of habeas corpus. When the Supreme
Court, in February 1868, refused to dismiss the prisoner's
appeal' 17 and proceeded to hear arguments on the merits, Con-
gress, over President Johnson's veto, forthwith repealed the par-
ticular jurisdictional statute upon which the Court's jurisdiction
of that appeal was based.118 That occasion for judicial invalida-
tion of the reconstruction legislation was thus foreclosed. 1
Other courts did find occasion to denounce acts done by the mil-
itary in the South during the interval between the end of the
war and the commencement of military reconstruction.12 0 The
tion of those statutes [the 1867 jurisdictional foreclosure and another], or as to the ques-
tions of constitutional law which may arise thereunder." 98 U.S. at 285. Significantly,
however, the Court's order in Beckwith was for a new trial, whereas application of the
1867 statute would have dictated dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion rather than remand for a new trial. Justices Field and Clifford, dissenting from the
majority's view on the different issue addressed, and thus reaching the constitutional
issue which the majority purported to reserve, set forth compelling arguments to show
that the 1867 Act's attempted jurisdictional foreclosure was unconstitutional. 98 U.S. at
285-306. Majority opinions in other cases from the same period suggest strongly that the
other Justices, had they chosen to address the issue in Beckwith, would have agreed; e.g.,
Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U.S. 712 (1876), discussed infra note 121.
Earlier acts passed by Congress in 1863 and 1866, not addressing jurisdiction but
granting immunity to soldiers and others who had acted pursuant to orders of the Presi-
dent or his military commanders, were held unconstitutional and ignored by state courts,
in Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill. 142 (1867), and Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370 (1863). The
Supreme Court noted but found it unnecessary to rule on the same issue in Mayor of
Nashville v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 851 (1868); and subsequent consideration of the
dubious features of the 1863 and 1866 statutes was foreclosed by the valid two year
statute of limitations imposed for such claims; see Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U.S. 633 (1844).
116. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 475 (1867).
117. Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1868).
118. Act of March 27, 1868, § 2, 15 Stat. 44. The jurisdictional foreclosure statute
enacted in 1867, see supra note 114, did not apply because the facts in McCardle had
arisen after 'July 1, 1866, the cutoff date of that statute.
119. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
120. E.g., McLaughlin v. Green, 50 Miss. 453, 461 (1874); In re Egan, 8 F. Cas. 368
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 4,303).
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Supreme Court was never squarely faced with the issue, how-
ever, although its disposition of related issues during the next
several years makes it clear that it would have denounced the
legislation had a proper case within its jurisdiction been made. 21
By the summer of 1868, reconstructed civil governments had
been set up in eight of the former secessionist states, and the
army withdrawn. Reconstruction in the others was completed in
1870. By then, the general who had been in charge of the whole
enterprise had become President of the United States.
The end of the military reconstruction program did not
mark the end of the Radicals' infatuation with military force as
the means to impose the national will upon the South. Violence
and intimidation against blacks had not been ended by the pro-
cess of reconstruction; in fact, Southern blacks bore the brunt of
Southern extremist retaliation for the outrageous military mea-
sures the Radicals had employed on their behalf. Continued vio-
lence provoked new responses from Congress; and while martial
law as such was not reimposed, Congress again indulged the
Radicals' penchant for enforcement of the laws with military
force. The so-called Enforcement Act of 1870,12 like the Civil
Rights Act passed four years before, 2 " empowered process serv-
ers appointed for its purposes to call out not only the posse, but
portions of the army and navy,12 4 and also authorized the Presi-
dent to employ the armed forces to aid in the execution of that
121. See, e.g., Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266 (1878). In Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U.S.
712 (1876), the Supreme Court considered an order of a Reconstruction military com-
mander, purportedly authorized by the Military Reconstruction Acts, which annulled a
decree issued by a civilian chancery court during the Reconstruction period. Although
the commander's order was within the letter of the authorizing Reconstruction Acts, the
Court held it void-but without undertaking to declare the Acts themselves void. The
Court said:
The meaning of the legislature constitutes the law. A thing may be within
the letter of a statute, but not within its meaning....
The clearest language would be necessary to satisfy us that Congress
intended that the power given by these Acts should be so exercised.
It was an arbitrary stretch of authority, needful to no good end that can be
imagined. Whether Congress could have conferred the power to do such an act,
is a question we are not called upon to consider. It is an unbending rule of law,
that the exercise of military power, where the rights of the citizen are con-
cerned, shall never be pushed beyond what the exigency requires.
91 U.S. at 71.
122. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, repealed by Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch.
25, 28 Stat. 36.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
124. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 10, 16 Stat. at 140, 142, repealed by Act of Feb.
8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36.
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Act.12 5
This same mad attachment to the expedient of military
means for law enforcement, despite repeated judicial pronounce-
ments exposing its constitutional invalidity, accounts for the
military enforcement provision of the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act,
which survives as 10 U.S.C. section 333. The 1871 Act made no
distinction between "insurrection" and mere "violence, unlawful
combination, or conspiracy;" for any of these circumstances it
authorized distinctively military force:
[I]n all such cases, . . . it shall be lawful for the President, and
it shall be his duty to take such measures, by the employment
of the militia or the land and naval forces of the United States,
or of either, or by other means, as he may deem necessary for
the suppression of such insurrection, domestic violence, or
combinations....
Moreover, this 1871 Act contained no requirement that civilian
means of federal law enforcement be first exhausted. The Act
was confined to circumstances in which state authorities "shall
either be unable to protect, or shall, from any cause, fail in or
refuse protection of the people in [their federal constitutional]
rights .. . ,,;127 but there was no requirement that a civilian
federal force, such as the federal marshals and posse, be consid-
ered or employed before resort to distinctively military force.
In other words, this 1871 Act displayed the very features
that had so alarmed most members of the Congress in 1792. At
that earlier time, when the members of the Congress were loyal
to the traditional and constitutional due process restraints on
the domestic application of military force, they had tailored
their legislation to conform to the constitutional requirements." 8
Among the post-Civil War Radicals, however, there was no such
respect for the civilian constitutional tradition; and the 1871 Act
was adopted despite its patent offense to constitutional law.
While most of the other Reconstruction Era statutory provi-
sions calling for military intervention one by one have passed
away, 1 29 this one still remains, a relic of that shameful period
125. Id. at § 13, 16 Stat. at 143.
126. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 3, 17 Stat. 13, 14.
127. Id.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 68-78.
129. The substance of section 5 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, see supra note 104,
allowing appointment of military personnel to assist in executing warrants or other pro-
cess in connection with certain civil rights offenses, still survives as 42 U.S.C. 1989
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when the Congress and a General-turned-President knowingly
and willfully determined to trample constitutional principle
underfoot in their march on an otherwise noble crusade. The
statute has occasionally been invoked by presidents as a pretext
for the intervention of distinctively military force, as in the Pull-
man strike of 1894 and the racial and urban riots of the 1960's;
but never in those instances or in any other has any court had
occasion to consider its constitutional validity.'30 It seems quite
impossible that it could survive judicial scrutiny. Nevertheless,
generations after the other excesses of the Reconstruction Era
have been forgotten, this one bastard offspring of the rapacious
militarism of that day remains, to serve as a third foundation for
military intervention in the United States.
IV. FAULTY FOUNDATIONS, PART Two: OTHER PURPORTED
BASES OF THE CIVIL DISTURBANCE REGULATIONS
The three statutes examined in the preceding part of this
article had been claimed as authority for the 1968 Civil Distur-
bance Regulations and are likewise claimed by the new Regula-
tions which have been in force since 1972. Unlike the 1968 Regu-
lations, however, the 1972 Regulations also claim to be
authorized on three additional grounds.
The first of these claimed additional bases is a sweeping
concept of inherent executive emergency power. The second is a
purported constitutional power of the executive to use military
force to protect federal property and federal governmental func-
tions. The third is an obscure Joint Resolution of Congress per-
(1976).
130. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), was a habeas corpus case, reviewing an impris-
onment for contempt of an injunction restraining participation in the Pullman strike. No
issue concerning the use that had been made of troops, or the validity of the statute here
under discussion, was present in the case; the issue was whether a federal court had
jurisdiction to issue such an injunction on the complaint of the United States. While
holding that it did, the Supreme Court in dicta noted that even if no such effective
judicial weapon were available the federal government still would not be impotent: "If
the emergency arises, the army of the Nation, and all its militia, are at the service of the
nation to compel obedience to its laws." Id. at 582 (emphasis added). Nothing in the case
required the Court to consider whether such an "emergency" had arisen in the circum-
stances before it, and it refrained from doing so. Neither did it attempt to elaborate in
general terms what might constitute an "emergency" sufficient to warrant such military
means, although the context of its dictum was a discussion of the incapacity of civil
courts, reminiscent of the classic test of insurrection by which the legitimacy of recourse
to the military had traditionally been determined. See also id. at 597. The Debs case is
discussed further infra note 138.
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taining to the Secret Service. Each of these purported bases
must be considered in turn-together with a recently recon-
firmed century-old statute which destroys all three.
A. The Purported "Emergency Authority," and the Posse
Comitatus Act
The new Civil Disturbance Regulations claim that the Con-
stitution, without the aid of any statute, confers what the Regu-
lations call "the emergency authority." This purportedly
authorizes
prompt and vigorous Federal action, including use of military
forces, to prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property
and to restore governmental functioning and public order when
sudden and unexpected civil disturbances, disasters, or calami-
ties seriously endanger life and property and disrupt normal
governmental functions to such an extent that duly constituted
local authorities are unable to control the situations. 
13
The Regulations maintain that exertion of this "emergency
authority" is appropriate whenever "civil disturbances, disasters,
or calamities" endanger life or property (whether or not federal
property) or "disrupt normal governmental functions to such an
extent that duly constituted local authorities are unable to con-
trol the situations." The term "civil disturbances" is given a
broad definition for purposes of the new Regulations, to include
not only "group acts of violence" but also other "disorders prej-
udicial to public law and order."13 2 "Disorder," which is not
defined in the Regulations, is a term susceptible of many inter-
pretations. So also is the word "calamities," which is not defined
in the Regulations. There may be political or economic or social
"calamities"-"disturbances" of the established political
order-that do not involve "group acts of violence" or any of the
characteristics commonly connoted by terms such as "riot,"
"tumult," and "unlawful assembly" at all.
This "emergency authority" may be invoked, according to
the new Regulations, whenever a disorder is serious enough to
"disrupt normal governmental functions to such an extent that
duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situa-
tions." The reference to "duly constituted local authorities"
131. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4 (c)(1)(i) (1982).
132. 32 C.F.R. § 215.3(a) (1982).
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makes it evident that the purported power is to be invoked even
when normal state or local governmental functions are dis-
rupted, and not merely when federal activities are disrupted.
Yet there is no explanation given in the Regulations as to what
constitutes "normalcy" of governmental functions, what consti-
tutes their "disruption," or what might constitute "inability" on
the part of local authorities to control a situation. It is clear,
however, that the Regulations countenance federal military
intervention in a state without any request from the state at all,
even where the intervention is purportedly for the purpose of
enforcing state law; the judgment as to whether local authorities
are able to control a situation is to be made, not by local or state
governmental officials, but by federal or even by military offi-
cials, as provided elsewhere in the Regulations.3 s
Moreover, according to the new Regulations the role that
the federal troops are to play in such situations is not a
subordinate role of assistance to civil authorities in their own
enforcement of the laws. Rather, on the premise that the local
civil authorities are "unable to control" the situation, the Regu-
lations give the military a free hand to "restore governmental
functioning and public order .. "134
All of this would be remarkable enough if the discretion to
invoke this purported "emergency authority" were reserved to
the President himself; but under the new Regulations, it is not.
Each of the statutes in title 10, examined earlier, whatever its
limits or constitutional faults, at least requires personal involve-
ment of the President; for each requires the issuance of a presi-
dential proclamation.'Is The Regulations, however, specifically
provide that not even a presidential executive order or presiden-
tial directive to the Secretary of Defense is required in cases
within this purported "emergency authority."13' 6 The critical
decisions all may be made by inferior-and indeed, by mili-
tary-officials, as will be elaborated more fully later in this
article."
The 1968 Regulations had contained nothing at all compa-
rable to this purported "emergency authority." It is the offspring
133. See infra text accompanying notes 210-32.
134. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4 (c)(1)(i) (1982).
135. 10 U.S.C. § 334 (1976).
136. 32 C.F.R. § 215(a) (1981).
137. See infra text accompanying notes 210-32.
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of Nixon-era claims to enlarged executive privilege and power.118
Although it is described in the Regulations as conferred by
the Constitution, one would search that document in vain for
any language conferring any such "emergency authority" in
express terms. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Regula-
tions do not pretend that the "emergency authority" is con-
ferred by any express language, but rather assert that it is
"based upon the inherent legal right of the U.S. government-a
sovereign national entity under the Federal Constitution-to
insure [sic] the preservation of public order and the carrying out
of governmental operations within its territorial limits, by force
if necessary." ' Since the Regulations acknowledge that the
" emergency authority" has no statutory basis, it is apparent that
what is being claimed is that it exists as an inherent prerogative
of the executive branch. In fact, as will be seen below, the Regu-
lations maintain that this executive prerogative persists in spite
of a statute which specifically negates it.
To discredit this sweeping claim of inherent executive pre-
rogative to employ military force to execute the laws, it is not
even necessary to maintain that such a claim is precluded by the
138. While Nixon was Vice President under Eisenhower, Attorney General Brownell
had expressed "grave doubts as to the authority of the Congress to limit the [purported]
constitutional powers of the President to enforce the laws and preserve the peace under
circumstances which he deems appropriate," with military troops. 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 313,
331 (1957). Brownell did not elaborate his "doubts," however, because he claimed con-
gressional authority by virtue of 10 U.S.C. §§ 332-33 (1976) for the use of troops in con-
nection with the Little Rock, Arkansas, school integration crisis.
A similar assertion of the unlimitable inherent executive power was made at the end
of the nineteenth century by the then Judge Advocate General of the Army: G. LiEBER,
THE USE OF THE ARMY IN AID OF THE CIVIL POWER (1898). Lieber, however, could offer
absolutely no relevant judicial authority for his assertion. One authority which Lieber
sought to turn to his purpose was the statement of the Supreme Court in Ex parte Sie-
bold that:
We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle, that the government of the
United States may, by means of physical force, exercised through its official
agents, execute on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that
belong to it. This necessarily involves the power to keep the peace to that
extent.
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 395 (1879). Siebold, however, involved the use of federal
marshals, not military troops, and nothing the Court said in any way supports the use of
military force. Moreover, nothing in Siebold addresses the relative authority of Presi-
dent and Congress, or supports an assertion that the Congress is unable to control the
use by the President even of federal marshals, let alone the federal military.
The other claimed authority misapplied by Lieber was a dictum in In re Debs, 158
U.S. 564, 581-82 (1895), already discussed supra note 130. Nothing in the Debs dictum
addressed at all the question of Congress's power to control the President's use of troops.
139. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c)(1) (1981).
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constitutional rule of civilian due process, which historically
developed as a reaction against precisely such claims by succes-
sive English kings. Even if one is unpersuaded by the contention
advanced in the preceding pages-that the language of due pro-
cess in the fifth amendment was intended to guarantee the
traditional rule against military intrusions at the instance of any
branch of the federal government-one must still consider the
constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers. When that
doctrine is applied, this claim of sweeping inherent executive
power confronts a constitutional obstacle which would be insur-
mountable even if all of the statutory provisions heretofore
examined, objectionable though they seem to this writer, were
deemed valid.
The President's power and duty to "take Care that the laws
be faithfully executed"14 repels any suggestion that he may
flout them. To be sure, even without specific statutory authori-
zation the executive may petition the judiciary to exercise its
equity powers so as to protect federal interests from harm;14
and it is arguable that some direct executive measures might
properly be taken to promote or preserve federal interests, even
without judicial involvement, where no statute on point may be
found. 42 Presidential power to act in disobedience of a statute,
however, could be sustained only on a finding that the statute
were void. 43 Although the Constitution makes the President
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, 44 it just as clearly
gives to Congress the power "to make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,"' 45 and to make all
laws necessary and proper to effectuate not only the latter but
also the President's Commander-in-Chief power.1 46 Statutes
restricting the use of the military, therefore, have an ample con-
stitutional base. Thus it is not possible, unless the Constitution
be rewritten, to maintain that the President has authority to
140. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
141. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
142. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
143. Id.
144. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
145. U.S. CONST. art. I, cl. 14; see also cl. 15, 16. To make rules for their government
and regulation must mean to make the rules according to which the Commander-in-
Chief is to govern them, and seems clearly to preclude the notion that he may govern or
use them contrary to the rules thus laid down by Congress.
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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make any use of the armed forces, in domestic situations,
which Congress has specifically forbidden.
Congress acted a century ago to negate precisely the same
executive "emergency authority" which the new Regulations
now claim. The Radicals' military reconstruction of the former
secessionist states had been completed in 1870. Nevertheless,
throughout the presidency of General Grant, federal army troops
continued to be used with some frequency to execute federal
laws in the South, pursuant to provisions of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866," the Enforcement Act of 1870,149 the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871,150 and otherwise. By the end of President Grant's
second term, this continued recourse to the military expedient
was exacting a substantial political toll. As voter sentiment
swung away from the Radical Republicans and toward the Dem-
ocrats, accusations were made in Congress that the federal
troops were intimidating voters in the- South, seizing political
prisoners, interfering with civil governments in the states, and
even removing and installing state legislatures again.151
In the presidential election of 1876, Democrat Tilden had
won a popular plurality of more than a quarter-million votes,
carrying four Northern states as well as nearly all of the South.
His vote in the electoral college, however, was one short of a
majority so long as four states where returns had been chal-
lenged remained in doubt; and in the end, the electoral votes of
all four were awarded to Republican Hayes, who thus became
President by a margin of one electoral vote. In two of the states
where the vote was in question-Louisiana and South Caro-
lina-unpopular Republican governments were being main-
tained in power only with federal bayonets. While the outcome
of the election was still unresolved, Democrats in Congress
charged that, had it not been for intimidation of voters by the
federal troops, the vote in many districts would have differed
enough that an electoral majority for Tilden would have been
147. There is good constitutional authority for the proposition that the President is
the paramount instrument of the nation for dealing in international affairs, and this
proposition might support a corollary claim to make use of troops in connection with
international affairs without regard to congressional directives. We are concerned here,
however, with domestic situations, where the corollary falls because the proposition of
presidential paramountcy has no place.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 122-25.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
151. See 7 CONG. REc. 3849, 3850-52, 4240, 4245, 4248 (1878).
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assured. As a result the House of Representatives, where the
Democrats had held a majority since the previous congressional
election, passed a Resolution in December 1876, calling upon
outgoing President Grant to account for the use that had been
made of federal troops in the South during the several months
preceding the November election. On January 22, 1877, six
weeks before leaving office, Grant sent to the House his reply.152
Grant's reply did not assuage the anti-militaristic sentiment
of the Democrats in the House, who responded by attaching to
the 1877 appropriation bill for the army a substantive rider
designed to restrict the domestic use of troops. However, the
decision of President Hayes at the commencement of his presi-
dential term to withdraw the army from South Carolina and
Louisiana (whereupon the carpetbag Republican governments in
those states immediately yielded control to the Democrats)
diminished the felt urgency of reform. While the House insisted
on its rider, the Senate would not agree; and as a result no army
appropriation bill at all was passed until November, when the
fiscal year was half over and the House, judging Hayes to be
more restrained than Grant in the use of troops, agreed to post-
pone the reform."' The next year, however, those who were
determined to curtail military intervention in civilian affairs did
secure approval in both houses for a similar rider to the Army
Appropriation Act of June 1878.1k The terms of that rider,
which came to be called the "Posse Comitatus Act," were
directly responsive to the arguments which President Grant had
put forward in his reply to the House Resolution a year and a
half before.
In his reply Grant had specified several different legal bases
upon which he considered the various instances of the use of
military troops to have been justified. The situation in South
152. The House Resolution and President Grant's reply are printed in G. LIEBER,
THE USE OF THE ARMY IN AID OF THE CIVIL POWER 4-9 (1898).
153. During the interval created by this impasse in the last half of 1877, when the
Army was without an appropriation, President Hayes was confronted with widespread
labor riots. Despite the urgings of cabinet members, other advisers, and industrial lead-
ers, who wanted to see vigorous strike-breaking action, Hayes exercised considerable
restraint in the use of troops, employing them only late in the period of the strike and
then only to enforce judicial process. Hayes' relative moderation, compared to Grant's
use of troops, doubtless contributed to the willingness of the House to postpone its insis-
tence upon legislative repudiation of Grant's claim of inherent executive power until the
following year.
154. Act of June 18, 1878, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152.
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Carolina he claimed had amounted to insurrection, so he relied
upon the very old statute now codified as 10 U.S.C. section 331
for his utilization of troops there. With regard to certain
instances in several other states, he relied for justification upon
the Civil War and Reconstruction Era statutes now codified as
10 U.S.C. sections 332 and 333, and upon the terms of a section
of the Enforcement Act of 1870, discussed earlier,155 which has
since been repealed. As to certain other situations, Grant
claimed simply to have made troops available to be used as a
posse in accordance with the traditional practice-although the
critical distinction between distinctively military and civilian
character, which had been the essential feature of that tradi-
tional practice, by then had been neglected in practice for many
years.
Most notably, however, for circumstances not coming within
any of the foregoing justifications, this General who had directed
the whole process of Reconstruction before becoming President
now asserted a "power as commander of the Army and Navy to
prevent or suppress resistance to the laws of the United
States. . . ."56 "The companies stationed in the other States,"
he declared, "have been employed to secure the better execution
of the laws of the United States and to preserve the peace of the
United States. 1 5 7 In support of this assertion of executive power
not derived from any statute, Grant referred to a hodgepodge of
historical incidents-all of which, however, actually were appli-
cations either of one of the statutes or else of the traditional
posse comitatus practice. In substance, President Grant was
making an unprecedented claim of inherent executive power to
employ military force to execute the laws and preserve domestic
peace.
Congress's response to Grant's king-like assertion of inher-
ent executive power to enforce the laws by military means was a
flat repudiation of the claim: the Posse Comitatus Act declared:
From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to
employ any part of the Army of the United States as a posse
comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of executing the laws,
except in such cases and under such circumstances as such
employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the
155. See supra text accompanying note 125.
156. G. LIEaR, supra note 151, at 9.
157. Id. at 8.
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Constitution or by act of Congress. 5 '
Although its popular name tends to focus attention solely upon
the posse concept, it is important to note that the Act forbids
the use of the Army as a posse, "or otherwise," to execute the
laws, except as expressly authorized.
The various existing statutory authorizations, despite the
constitutional defects to be found in most of them, were left
undisturbed by this Act. Its whole purpose was to put an end to
the extra-statutory practices which President Grant had sought
to justify. The critical word in the Act adapted to accomplish
this purpose was the word "expressly. 15'  The traditional prac-
tice of using troops as a posse in accordance with the Mansfield
Doctrine had been authorized by Congress; that was the func-
tion of section 9 of the old 1792 Act,160 and even though the
important interplay between that section and section 2 of the
old Act had been destroyed by the revisions made in 1861,101 the
substance of old section 9 still remained on the books when the
Posse Comitatus Act was passed. Nevertheless, while it is plain
from its history that authorization of the posse practice was the
entire purpose of that old statutory provision, its terms did not"expressly" authorize any use of troops. Consequently, the 1878
Act immediately put an end to the practice of federal marshals
158. Act of June 18, 1878, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (emphasis added). As it
survives in the Code today, the Posse Comitatus Act provides:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by
the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the
Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. 1385 (1976).
159. The Act originated in the House, with language which would have limited the
use of the Army or Navy to situations "expressly" authorized by Congress. 7 CONG. REc.
3586 (1878). Reference to naval forces was dropped, doubtless because the appropria-
tions bill under consideration was only for the army, 7 CONG. REC. 3578-79, 3877 (1878).
The Senate approved the measure on the second day of debate, 7 CONG. REc. 4302
(1878), but only after Senate Republicans had excised the word "expressly," 7 CONG.
REc. 4246-48 (1878), and added provision for situations that might be authorized "by the
Constitution," 7 CONG. Rac. 4240 (1878). The House, however, refused to accept any
such weakening of the prohibition they meant to impose. Reference to purported consti-
tutional authorization would be harmless if the word "expressly" were restored, for the
Constitution contains no "express" authorization for such use in the absence of a statute.
See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text. Restoration of the word "expressly,"
however, was crucial, and in conference the House conferees insisted upon its reinsertion,
see 7 CONG. Rzc. 4686 (1878). In the end, the Senate yielded on the matter, and before
final enactment the critical word "expressly" was restored to the text.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81, 92-96.
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using army troops as their posse.'
The Act also excepted from its prohibition such use of the
army as might be "expressly authorized by the Constitution."
The only provision in the Constitution dealing "expressly" with
any domestic use of the military, 63 however, is article I, section
162. Less than four months after the Posse Comitatus Act was adopted, the Attor-
ney General in a formal opinion entitled "Employment of the Military as a Posse," wrote
as follows:
It has been the practice of the government since its organization (so far as
known to me) to permit the military forces of the United States to be used in
subordination to the marshal of the United States when it was deemed neces-
sary that he should have their aid in order to the enforcement of his process.
This practice was deemed to be well sustained under the twenty-seventh sec-
tion of the judiciary act of 1789 [see supra note 73 and accompanying text],
which gave to the marshal power 'to command all necessary assistance in the
execution of his duty,' and was sanctioned not only by the custom of the Gov-
ernment, but by several opinions of my predecessors. Instructions given by my
predecessor, the Hon. William M. Evarts, of date August 20, 1868, state partic-
ularly the authority of the marshal in this regard, and call attention to the fact
that the military in such case obey the summons of the marshal as a posse
comitatus and act in subordination and obedience to the civil officer in whose
aid in the execution of process they are called, and only for the object of secur-
ing its execution.
While the right to summon a portion of the military forces where it can be
spared for the duty, as a part of the posse comitatus, is fairly to be inferred
from the provision in the judiciary act which I have already quoted, there is
found, however, no express authority by which the marshal may summon any
military force of the United States as a part of the posse comitatus.
16 Op. Att'y Gen. 162-63 (1878). He therefore concluded that the new Act forbade it. Id.
at 163. Two and one half years later the Attorney General advised that because of the
Act it would be impermissible to use "a detachment of troops to aid the civil authorities
in arresting certain persons in the State of Kentucky who are charged with the recent
robbery of the clerk of the engineer officer superintending the Government works on the
Tennessee River .. " 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 71 (1881). Other opinions barred the posse
practice on account of the Act in the Territory of Arizona, id. at 242 (1881), 17 Op. Att'y
Gen. 333 (1882); in the Territory of Oklahoma, 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 293 (1889); and in the
Territory of Alaska, id. at 368.
The traditional use of soldiers as a posse persisted, however, with regard to state
military forces and state officials, see, e.g., State v. Coit, 8 Ohio Dec. 62 (1897).
163. None of the constitutional clauses commonly relied upon by apologists for mili-
tary law enforcement "expressly"-or, for that matter, even implicitly-authorizes the
executive to use the military to execute the laws, or to aid civil authorities in doing so.
The United States Constitution, article II, § 3, requires that the President "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed," but does not even remotely suggest that he may
use the military for that purpose. Article II, § 2, makes the President Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces, but does not indicate that he may use these instruments of
war either to assist or to displace the agencies of civil law enforcement. See supra note 7.
Moreover, since Congress is given power legislatively to determine how to carry into exe-
cution even this Commander-in-Chief power, see Article I, § 8, cl. 18, it is impossible to
claim the Commander-in-Chief clause as "express" constitutional authorization to the
1983] Foundations for Military Intervention 51
8, clause 15;1" and that clause only gives to Congress the power
executive to use the armed forces contrary to the will of Congress.
The "guaranty clause," article IV, § 4, provides that "the United States" shall guar-
antee each state, upon its request, "against domestic Violence." This power and duty,
however, is conferred by the Constitution not upon the executive, but upon "the United
States;" and article I, § 8, cl. 18 gives Congress power to provide by legislation for carry-
ing into execution all powers "vested by this constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." The guaranty clause, therefore,
cannot be viewed as "express" constitutional authorization for the executive to do any-
thing otherwise forbidden by Congress.
Careful study of the records of the Constitutional Convention indicates that the
draftsmen, in using the term "domestic Violence" in the guaranty clause (and also in
authorizing Congress to provide for use of the militia "to execute the Laws of the
Union," article I, § 8, cl. 15), probably had in mind only situations of treasonous vio-
lence, i.e., insurrection. See the analysis of the Convention records in Soldiers, Riots,
and Revolution, supra note 14, at 35-39. Alternatively, it is possible that the draftsmen
had in mind the Mansfield Doctrine, which provided for use of troops as civilians in
situations of noninsurrectionary violence; see The New Civil Disturbance Regulations,
supra note 14, at 588. At least there is nothing in the guaranty clause that expressly
authorizes any use of military force to deal with domestic violence less than insurrection.
Indeed, it was precisely to safeguard against the risk that this clause (and the clause
contemplating militia execution of federal laws) might be construed to authorize military
force to suppress non-insurrectionary violence that the Bill of Rights, including the fifth
amendment's guarantee of civilian due process, was adopted. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 21-44. Any notion that the guaranty clause, after adoption of the Bill of Rights,
could be construed to authorize military measures to deal with non-insurrectionary vio-
lence was (or ought to have been) dispelled by the contemporaneous construction of that
language reflected in the earliest congressional legislation, see supra text accompanying
notes 51-66 and 68-83.
The demise of the Mansfield Doctrine has made it impossible to apply the law exe-
cution language of article I, § 8, cl. 15 consistently with due process, other than to
instances of insurrectionary resistance to federal laws. The "domestic Violence" language
of the guaranty clause, however, need not be construed as confined to insurrections,
because it does not expressly authorize military measures. The protective duty imposed
by this clause can be amply fulfilled as to violence not amounting to insurrection (e.g., as
to riots and civil disorders) without offending the due process prohibition against mili-
tary measures. Even though the Mansfield Doctrine has been forgotten (and even though
the Posse Comitatus Act would now preclude such posse use of troops anyway), Congress
certainly has power by virtue of the guaranty clause and the necessary and proper clause
to provide for civilian federal assistance for riot and disorder suppression. Congress
could authorize the use of federal marshals, or some specialized group of them, like the
Marshals' Service Special Operations Group. Congress could authorize use of agents of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or Treasury Department agents, or could create a
federal civilian police force specifically for the purpose. Congress could set up a system
for interstate lending of police resources, or even provide for "federalizing" police
resources from sister states. The necessary and proper clause and the supremacy clause
are ample to surmount any objections of "state sovereignty." The impediments to these
civilian means of federal suppression of violence are limitations of congressional imagina-
tion, not constraints of constitutional law. All that is forbidden is the one expedient that
has, by default of imagination, become the norm: the use of the military to execute the
laws.
164. "The Congress shall have Power ... To provide for calling forth the Militia to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." U.S. CONST.
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to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the
Union. This, as much as the other provisions cited earlier,""
confirms the power of Congress over the matter, and negates any
concept of inherent executive authority to use military force to
execute the laws. As plainly, therefore, as it prohibited any con-
tinuation of the traditional practice of using army troops as a
posse, the 1872 Act prohibited their being used "otherwise" pur-
suant to the notion of inherent executive power which had been
propounded by President Grant, and is now relied upon by the
Civil Disturbance Regulations.
The language confining the exceptions from its prohibition
to those "expressly" provided by Constitution or statute
remains in the current version of the Posse Comitatus Act in
force today. 66 The new Regulations pretend that the notion of a
constitutionally implied extra-statutory "emergency authority"
is consistent with this Act, but the pretense is too transparent;
in reciting the substance of the Act's prohibition, the new Regu-
lations notably omit the word "expressly.
1 67
Because the Posse Comitatus Act when enacted was a rider
to the Army Appropriation Act of 1878 (and because it was not
the navy that had been misused) it was only the use of "any part
of the Army" that the original language proscribed."" Decades
later the Army Air Corps developed and then spun off as a sepa-
rate branch of the armed services; and, when that happened,
Congress amended the Act to specify "any part of the Army or
the Air Force,"'" putting the statute into the form in which it
remains today. A bill which died of neglect in the Congress a
decade ago would have broadened the language to include any
part of "the Armed Forces of the United States;' 70 but decades
of consistent administrative construction had already given the
narrower language that broader effect. It was well understood, as
the legislative history of the Posse Comitatus Act makes clear,7
that the Act was an attempt by Congress to reassert the civilian
constitutional principle restraining the domestic use of any mill-
art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
165. See supra notes 145 and 146 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 158.
167. 32 C.F.R. 215.4(b) (1981).
168. See supra note 159.
169. Act of August 10, 1956, ch. 1041, § 18(a), 70A Stat. 626.
170. S. 2318, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
171. 7 CONG. REc. 3845-52, 4239-48, 4295-4305 (1878).
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tary force. Thus, the Navy Department long ago by regulation
adopted an equivalent prohibition, making specific reference to
the Act, and in 1974 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that Navy regulation to have been violated when the Treasury
Department used three enlisted Marines as undercover investi-
gators of federal firearms law violations.17 2 Consistent with this
long established view of the import of the Posse Comitatus Act,
the 1968 Civil Disturbance Regulations had declared that
"[a]lthough the Navy and Marine Corps are not expressly
included within its provisions, the Act is regarded as national
policy applicable to all military services of the United States. '1 7
The 1972 Regulations, however, notably omit any such state-
ment 1 7 4-another indication of the ominous new determination
to enlarge the possibilities of military intervention as far as pos-
sible beyond previous bounds.
Although now more than a century old, the Posse Comitatus
Act is no mere relic of history as far as Congress is concerned.
That Act, and the jealous watch against military involvement in
domestic law enforcement which it represents, was paramount in
the deliberations of Congress during 1981 when it considered
and adopted section 905 of the Department of Defense Authori-
zation Act of 1982.175 The enactment of section 905 on December
1, 1981, added sections 371 through 378 to title 10 of the United
States Code. These new statutory provisions are notable in cer-
tain respects as authorizing limited law enforcement use of mili-
tary resources where no such statutory authorization had existed
before. The new provisions are far more notable, however, for
the deliberate refusal of Congress, in enacting them, to counte-
nance any such use of military resources as the "emergency
authority" pretended by the Civil Disturbance Regulations
portends.
The new provisions thus added to title 10 of the United
States Code authorize the Secretary of Defense, for the first
time, to "make available any equipment. .. of the Army, Navy,
Air Force, or Marine Corps to any Federal, State, or local civil-
ian law enforcement official for law enforcement purposes. 1 6
They also authorize the Secretary to assign members of the
172. United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1974).
173. 32 C.F.R. § 187.4(b) (1971).
174. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(b) (1981).
175. P.L. 97-86, 95 Stat. 1115 (1981).
176. 10 U.S.C. § 372 (1981).
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armed forces "to train Federal, State, and local civilian law
enforcement officials in the operation and maintenance of equip-
ment made available under [the provision just quoted] and to
provide expert advice relevant to" the use of that equipment for
law enforcement purposes."' Such Defense Department equip-
ment, training, and advice had occasionally been made available
prior to this 1981 statutory authorization; and in enacting these
provisions Congress believed, as was testified by administrative
personnel, that the new legislation merely "clarifies existing
administrative practice. 17 8 Such prior practice as had existed
with regard to making military equipment available for civilian
law enforcement, however, actually had been without any
authority in law.17 9
177. 10 U.S.C. § 373 (1981).
178. H. REP. No. 71 (II), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1791, 1792.
179. The Posse Comitatus Act foreclosed the use of "any part of' the Army or Air
Force to execute the laws, except as "expressly" allowed. The use of an Air Force heli-
copter and its Air Force crew to search for an escaped prisoner, for example, has been
held to be a violation of the Act, the Court observing:
The innocence and harmlessness of the particular use of the Air Force in the
present case, the dissimilarity of that use to the uses that occasioned the enact-
ment, these considerations are irrelevant to the operation of a statute that is
absolute in its command and explicit in its exceptions.
Wrynn v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 457, 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1961). What inflamed revolu-
tionary passions in eighteenth century New England was precisely the soldiers' red
tunics, army muskets, and bayonets. In old England the men who served as the civilian
posse and who served as the King's soldiers were the same men; what gave rise to Magna
Carta and its insistence that civil law be enforced by the law of the land rather than by
military measures was precisely the equipment that was used: helmet and breastplate
and broadsword and lance--the instruments of war-had no place in domestic law
enforcement.
It was alarm not only over military personnel but over the appearance of military
equipment in domestic law enforcement situations that led to enactment of the Posse
Comitatus Act. At that time, no one actually conceived that military armaments might
be loaned out and borne by civilian officials rather than soldiers, but the legislative his-
tory of the Act shows that it was the weapons and conveyances and trappings of the
Army, as much as or more than the persons of the soldiers, that was the focus of the Act.
In the House, for example, Congressman Robertson of Louisiana spoke from his per-
sonal observation of the "moral interference" of military accoutrements: the intimidation
of newly enfranchised black voters by squads of soldiers purportedly exercising them-
selves and their horses, riding through the parish and past the polling place "armed and
equipped,. . . in the uniform of the United States troops and with their cartridge-boxes
and arms." 7 CONG. REC. 3852 (1878). Immediately after Congressman Robertson's com-
ments, debate on the measure ceased and it was approved. Id.
In the Senate, on the first day of deliberations there was discussion of military activ-
ities not only intimidating electors but also combating illegal distillers to enforce the
federal revenue laws, and controlling labor unrest. When Senator Edmunds of Vermont
opposed the measure on the ground that some organized body must be available for
1983] Foundations for Military Intervention
More significant than the new legislation's first-time author-
ization of such loans of military equipment (and training in its
maintenance and operation), however, is its denial for purposes
of any other law enforcement application of certain additional
elements of military assistance it guardedly made available for
enforcing a few specified federal immigration, customs, and drug
laws. As to the latter few laws only, the new legislation provides
that in certain statutorily defined "emergency circumstances,"
and pursuant to a cabinet-level request for assistance, military
personnel themselves may be permitted to operate or maintain
the military equipment made available to the civilian authori-
ties.180 Even in such exceptional situations, however, the new
legislation precludes the "direct participation" of military per-
sonnel in law enforcement activities. '81 Moreover, military per-
sonnel may be used in connection with such equipment even
with respect to enforcement of those few specified statutes,
"only to the extent the equipment is used for monitoring and
communicating the movement of air and sea traffic, ' 18 2 or when
it is used "outside the land area of the United States .. .as a
base of operations" for federal civilian officials enforcing the
drug, customs, or immigration laws, "and to transport such law
national law enforcement, and that soldiers are no different from a conventional posse, 7
CONG. REc. 4241-42, 4244-46 (1878), Senator Wallace of Pennsylvania met his argument
with a hypothetical pointing up the distinction by reference, not to the persons of the
soldiers, but to their equipment, their arms. Suppose, Senator Wallace suggested, "a bat-
tery of artillery" brought to Scranton to deal with "difficulty among the laboring men." 7
CONG. REC. 4246 (1878). The distinction between military and civilian equipment
explains why so many of the Senators in 1878 found the whole notion that soldiers might
be used as a posse, as contemplated by the subtle and by then long forgotten Mansfield
Doctrine, to be incomprehensibly odd.
Thus, until the 1981 legislation there was never any basis in law for the idea that
military equipment (not to mention military operators and support personnel) could be
used for civil law enforcement without offense to the Posse Comitatus Act. The prohibi-
tion was categorical; it precluded the use of "any part."
Congress included in the section of its 1981 legislation authorizing the Secretary to
make Defense Department equipment available the phrase, "in accordance with other
applicable law," 10 U.S.C. § 372 (Supp. V 1981), contemplating in particular the Econ-
omy Act, 31 U.S.C. 686. See H.R. REP. No. 71 (II), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in
1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1792. The Economy Act could not be regarded as
authority for making such equipment available, see infra text accompanying notes 235-
41; but it does prescribe procedures appropriate to be followed when loans of equipment
authorized by the new Act are made.
180. 10 U.S.C. § 374 (Supp. V 1981).
181. 10 U.S.C. § 375 (Supp. V 1981).
182. 10 U.S.C. § 374(b) (Supp. V 1981).
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enforcement officials in connection with such operations. '"1 83 The
limitation to activities "outside the land area of the United
States," resulted specifically from Congress's insistence upon
"[t]he traditional opposition to military participation in U.S. law
enforcement activities," which "does not exist to the same
extent when that participation occurs overseas."184
It is clear from numerous passages in the relevant commit-
tee reports that Congress in 1981 was acting on the premise that,
but for the specific authorization given by this new legislation,
even such minimal use of military personnel as having them
maintain or operate the military equipment made available to
civilian officials for law enforcement would have violated the
Posse Comitatus Act. The decision by Congress to grant such
authorization only in connection with federal drug, immigration,
and customs laws, and even in that connection to require both a
cabinet-level request and a demonstrable "emergency circum-
stance" satisfying a two-part statutory test, and even then to
restrict such use of military personnel (except with regard to air
and sea traffic monitoring equipment) to places "outside the
land area of the United States," and in any event to ensure
against their "direct participation" in any law enforcement
activity, seems rather persuasively to suggest a firm congres-
sional resolve to maintain, with only the most limited and care-
fully guarded exceptions, the otherwise categorical prohibition of
the Posse Comitatus Act.
As the Posse Comitatus Act was Congress's repudiation a
century ago of President Grant's claim of inherent executive
power to use military force in exigent circumstances to execute
the laws and maintain peace and order, so might its 1981 action
be properly viewed as Congress's repudiation of the claim of
"emergency authority" propounded in the 1972 Civil Distur-
bance Regulations.
The will of Congress, however, is not always respected by
the executive branch. The Department of Defense regulations on
"DOD Cooperation With Civilian Law Enforcement Officials,"
added to title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations in 1982,188
purport to be consistent with the requirements of 10 U.S.C. sec-
183. 10 U.S.C. § 374(c) (Supp. V 1981).
184. H.R. REP. No. 71(11), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. Naws 1785, 1798 (separate views of Reps. John R. Seiberling and Don
Edwards regarding language later moved and approved on the floor).
185. 32 C.F.R. § 213 (1982).
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tions 371-78; although in many respects they are consistent, in
many respects they are not. Section 213.10 of these newest regu-
lations retaliates against the latest congressional reaffirmation of
the prohibition against military intervention with a catalogue,
more extensive than any previously published anywhere, of cir-
cumstances in which the Posse Comitatus Act allegedly does not
apply. Section 213.10 (a)(2) lists in four categories, with a total
of twenty-two separately itemized subcategories (in addition to
10 U.S.C. sections 331-33), activities which, according to the
Department of Defense, "are not restricted by the Posse Comi-
tatus Act. . ., notwithstanding direct assistance to civilian law
enforcement officials." (emphasis added). By "direct assistance"
the regulation contemplates the use of military personnel in a
variety of actions including arrest, stop and frisk, interdiction of
a vehicle, pursuit, surveillance, investigation, and interroga-
tion. 86 These are the very activities which Congress directed
that even those military personnel assigned in a defined "emer-
gency circumstance" to operate loaned equipment used "outside
the land area of the United States" to enforce the immigration,
drug, or customs laws must assiduously avoid. 87 While Congress
regarded its authorization of unusual military aid with respect to
the latter few laws as an extraordinary measure for dealing with
peculiar and chiefly extraterritorial problems, and even so to be
guarded with stringent restrictions, the executive branch by 32
C.F.R. section 213.10 treats it as the one circumscribed anomaly
among a host of carte blanche authorizations for military inter-
vention in law enforcement affairs.
Some of the circumstances in which this newest regulation
claims that the Posse Comitatus Act is no bar are indeed cir-
cumstances in which military assistance has been authorized
expressly by Congress. These express authorizations include not
only 10 U.S.C. sections 331-33, but also a number of very spe-
cialized statutes-statutes which in fact are more specialized
and more limited than the Defense Department regulation
acknowledges them to be.188 Several other circumstances are
186. 32 C.F.R. § 213.10(3) (1982).
187. 10 U.S.C. § 375 (Supp. V 1981).
188. Citations to these statutory provisions are set out in 32 C.F.R. §
213.10(a)(2)(iv). The very limited scope of two of the cited statutes (18 U.S.C. § 351
(Supp. V 1981) and 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1976) and the irrelevance of a third (18 U.S.C. §
3056 (Supp. V 1981)) are discussed infra note 209 and accompanying text.
Some of the others are of dubious validity under the constitutional rule discussed in
1983]
58 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 7:1
grouped under the heading of "actions that are taken for the
this article, although some of the oldest of these might have stood constitutional muster
under the circumstances of an earlier day. For example, 43 U.S.C. § 1065 (1976) autho-
rizes the President to use either civil or military force "to remove and destroy any
unlawful enclosure of any of the public lands .... " This provision was enacted in 1885,
when there were still substantial tracts of public land in areas where little or no effective
civil authority was present. Another example is 25 U.S.C. § 180 (1976), which authorizes
the President to employ military force to remove persons settling on lands belonging by
treaty to any Indian tribe; this provision was enacted in 1834. Title 16 U.S.C. §§ 23 and
78 (1976) authorize the use of troops to remove intruders from, or to prevent them from
entering, Yellowstone, Sequoia, or Yosemite National Parks "for the purpose of destroy-
ing the game or objects of curiosity therein, or for any other purpose prohibited by law;"
a cabinet level request is required. The Yellowstone provision (Q 23) was enacted in 1883,
and the Sequoia and Yosemite provision (Q 78) in 1900. (The 1982 regulation also cites in
this connection 16 U.S.C. § 596, which, however, was repealed in 1933.)
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1989 (1976) authorizes use of military assistance by persons
appointed by magistrates to execute warrants or other process issued pursuant to certain
civil rights laws. This provision is a remnant of § 5 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the
dubious constitutionality of which has already been discussed in the text accompanying
supra notes 103-05.
Title 48 U.S.C. § 1422 (1976) (as to Guam) and 48 U.S.C. § 1591 (1976) (as to the
Virgin Islands) authorize the governors of those territories to request military assistance
not only to deal with insurrection or rebellion but also "to prevent or suppress lawless
violence." Insofar as these provisions are deemed applicable to mere riot or civil disorder,
they seem subject to the same constitutional doubts noted with regard to 10 U.S.C. § 332
(1976), see supra text accompanying notes 68-98.
Title 50 U.S.C. § 220 (1976) authorizes the use of parts of the Army or Navy in
extraordinary circumstances to prevent the removal of vessels or cargo from the custody
of customs officials. This provision was enacted in 1861 with reference to difficulties
encountered at the threshold of the Civil War, and is codified now (as it was in the
Revised Code of 1878) under the heading, "Insurrection." To construe it as applicable in
any situation not constituting an armed assault disabling the civilian organs of govern-
ment would present the same constitutional difficulties discussed in connection with 10
U.S.C. § 331 (1976), see supra text accompanying notes 50-67.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 97 (1976), originally enacted as Act of Feb. 23, 1799, ch. 12, § 1, 1
Stat. 619, requires "military officers commanding in any fort or station upon the sea-
coast" to obey quarantines and other regulations imposed by state health laws respecting
vessels arriving at the ports of such states. It also provides that such officers "shall faith-
fully aid in the execution of such quarantines and health laws," but only "according to
their respective powers and within their respective precincts." It thus does not authorize
any action otherwise outside the military officer's powers, and hence does not authorize
any action on their part enforcing the laws against civilians.
Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 112 and 1116 (1976) authorize the Attorney General to request
military assistance to enforce the federal laws prohibiting assaults and homicides against
the persons and families of foreign officials, foreign nationals who are official guests des-
ignated by the Secretary of State, and other persons who by international law are enti-
tled to special protection. The authorization for military assistance in these circum-
stances was enacted in 1976, the same legislation also authorizing requests for the
assistance of any civilian agency, federal, state, or local. The purpose of the legislation
was to ensure that the United States could fulfill obligations under international conven-
tions against terrorism. The legislative history indicates that such requests should be
made only in exceptional instances: "There may be circumstances-such as the takeover
of an embassy-when the Justice Department will need assistance from other federal,
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primary purpose of furthering a military or foreign affairs func-
tion of the United States, regardless of incidental benefits to
civilian authorities. '" 18 Most significantly, however, this newest
regulation includes among those circumstances in which even
"direct assistance" of military personnel purportedly can be pro-
vided without violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, circum-
stances coming within "the emergency authority" pretended by
the 1972 Civil Disturbance Regulations. 9"
Thus, although promulgated under color of implementing
Congress's 1981 legislation (by which Congress sought to reaf-
firm its 1878 repudiation of any executive emergency military
law enforcement prerogative), these newest regulations actually
reiterate the executive's claim to precisely that same preroga-
tive, asserted under the label "emergency authority" in the Civil
Disturbance Regulations of 1972.
B. The Purported "Protective Power"
The 1972 Civil Disturbance Regulations also assert that the
Constitution, without the aid of any statute "[aluthorizes Fed-
eral action, including the use of military forces, to protect Fed-
eral property and Federal governmental functions when the
need for protection exists and duly constituted local authorities
are unable or decline to provide adequate protection."191 The
1968 Regulations had provided that military forces could be
used to protect federal property and federal facilities, but had
State, or local agencies." H.R. REP. No. 1614, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, n.7, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 4480, 4483. Even so, the constitutionality of such
military assistance is dubious.
Title 48 U.S.C. § 1418 (1976) authorizes use of the armed forces to protect the rights
of discoverers of guano islands, extraterritorial islands considered, at the discretion of
the President, to appertain to the United States.
Title 22 U.S.C. §§ 408 and 461-62 authorize the use of the military to help enforce
the neutrality laws, preventing the illegal export of war materiel and the launching of
illegal expeditionary forces against foreign powers.
Title 16 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976) authorizes use of military personnel, services, equip-
ment (including aircraft and vessels) and facilities to enforce the fishery conservation
laws at sea.
Title 42 U.S.C. ] 378]9 (Supp. III 1979) authorizes the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA) to use "the available services, equipment, personnel, and facili-
ties of" other civilian or military agencies "in the establishment and use of services,
equipment, personnel, and facilities of the Administration." LEAA, however, has no law
enforcement authority. 42 U.S.C. § 3709(d)(a) (1976).
189. 32 C.F.R. § 213.10(a)(2)(i) (1982).
190. 32 C.F.R. § 213.10(a)(2)(ii)(A) (1982).
191. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c)(1)(ii) (1982).
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premised such use upon one of the statutes previously discussed,
10 U.S.C. section 332.192 That application of section 332 was
itself constitutionally dubious insofar as it failed to acknowledge
the incapacitation of civilian means as a necessary precondi-
tion;193 but at least the 1968 Regulations had made no claim to
an extra-statutory "protective power."
It may be conceded that the federal government has power,
conferred by the Constitution, to protect federal property and
functions. That concession, however, does not obviate the ques-
tion of how this admitted power is distributed among the three
branches of the federal government. It is upon Congress that the
Constitution confers power to make rules and regulations
respecting federal property,9 and to make laws necessary and
proper to effectuate federal functions;' 56 the executive is author-
ized merely to "take care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted." 196 As already noted in the preceding discussion concern-
ing the broader claimed "emergency authority," there are a few
things that the executive might do to protect federal property or
federal governmental functions in the absence of any relevant
legislation. There is absolutely nothing in the Constitution, how-
ever, suggesting that the executive's action in such instances,
where the threat is domestic, may take military form.'9 In any
event, the power to make laws for the protection of federal prop-
erty and functions being unequivocally conferred upon Congress,
any power the executive might have to the same ends is clearly
subject to such strictures as Congress might impose.198 There-
fore, even if the due process clause of the fifth amendment were
not a categorical prohibition against law enforcement use of the
military, such use of the military to protect federal property and
functions could not be made in the face of a statutory
prohibition.
The Posse Comitatus Act, therefore, is as much a repudia-
tion of the extra-statutory "protective power" claimed by the
1972 Civil Disturbance Regulations as it is of the broader "emer-
gency authority" those Regulations claim.
192. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 187.5(a)(1) (1971).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 68-98.
194. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
-196. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
197. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
198. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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Nonetheless, the 1982 regulations concerning "DOD Coop-
eration With Civilian Law Enforcement Officials" boldly reassert
this "protective power" falsely claimed by the Civil Disturbance
Regulations. 99 Indeed, the 1982 regulations repeat with new
emphasis the 1972 Regulations' assertion that both the "protec-
tive power" and the "emergency authority" arise under "the
inherent right of the U.S. Government, a sovereign national
entity under the U.S. Constitution, to ensure the preservation of
public order and the carrying out of governmental operations
within its territorial limits, by force if necessary."200 The asser-
tion is that these prerogatives inhere in the national government
by virtue of sovereignty and the Constitution; but nothing in
either implies that they inhere in the executive branch of that
government. On the contrary, the Constitution specifically vests
in Congress the power to determine when and how the armed
forces may be used. 0 ' What Congress has said is that military
resources may be used only when "expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress,"202 and nothing anywhere in
the Constitution (much less in any concept of "sovereignty")
expressly authorizes extra-statutory utilization of military
resources by the executive in any domestic situation, whether
there be some "emergency" or some need for "protective"
action, or otherwise. Congress's insistence upon rigorous adher-
ence to its century-old repudiation of all pretense to any inher-
ent executive power to use the military for law enforcement is
manifest both in the letter and in the legislative history of the
new legislation enacted in December 1981, on which these latest
Defense Department regulations purport to be based. Yet the
regulations regard that repudiation, insisted upon by Congress,
as having no effect. The thrust of the latest regulations is simply
that the executive will use military force whenever the executive
deems it expedient to do so, congressional prohibitions
notwithstanding.
C. House Joint Resolution 1292
The sixth and last basis claimed 20 3 for the Civil Disturbance
199. 32 C.F.R. § 213.10(a)(2)(ii)(B) (1982).
200. 32 C.F.R. § 213.10(a)(2)(ii) (1982) (paraphrasing 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c)(1) (1982)).
201. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
202. The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385.
203. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c)(2)(i)(D) (1981).
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Regulations is House Joint Resolution 1292, adopted June 6,
1968. Although this Resolution had been adopted before the
1968 Civil Disturbance Regulations had been promulgated, those
earlier Regulations had not claimed it as authority; but the 1972
Regulations do.
Section 2 of House Joint Resolution 1292 provides that:
Hereafter when requested by the Director of the United States
Secret Service, Federal Departments and agencies, unless such
authority is revoked by the President, shall assist the Secret
Service in the performance of its protective duties under sec-
tion 3056 of title 18 of the United States Code and the first
section of this joint resolution.2
The duties of the Secret Service in connection with which the
assistance called for by this Resolution is to be given include
enforcement of a variety of laws concerning fraud, counterfeit-
ing, forgery, and embezzlement affecting currency, government
securities, and funds and obligations of federally chartered and
federally insured financial institutions. Far more significant,
however, these duties include protection of the persons of the
President and Vice President, as well as the President-elect, the
families of the President and former Presidents, and major Pres-
idential and Vice Presidential candidates. In the performance of
these duties the Secret Service and its agents are empowered to
make warrantless arrests on reasonable grounds of belief with
regard to any felony under federal law, and warrantless arrests
for any lesser federal offense committed in their presence.
Presidents, past Presidents, their families, and candidates
are familiar targets not only for demented eccentrics but also for
political extremists seeking to excite or exploit civil turmoil. The
fact or reasonable suspicion of some radical plot might easily be
taken to justify extensive surveillance or enforcement activities
by the Secret Service. Such activities by the civilian Secret Ser-
vice might not be cause for alarm; but, if the armed forces could
then be called upon to aid the Secret Service in its task, a far
different situation would be at hand. The new Civil Disturbance
Regulations claim House Joint Resolution 1292 as authority for
invoking such military aid, even without any personal presiden-
tial action, merely on the request of the Secret Service Director.
204. Pub. L. 90-331, 82 Stat. 170 (1968). The Resolution has not been codified; it is
set out in the notes to 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (1976).
205. 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (Supp. III 1979).
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Reliance upon this Resolution as authority for military aid
to the Secret Service, however, is misplaced for the same reason
that the old legislation giving federal marshals powers
equivalent to state sheriffs could not sustain the traditional
posse use of troops after the Posse Comitatus Act: the Resolu-
tion does not "expressly" authorize it at all. The Resolution
speaks generally of "Federal Departments and agencies;" ' 6 and
even though this phrase is of course broad enough to include the
Department of Defense, there is no express indication that any
of the military resources administered by that civilian depart-
ment are to be comprehended.07
Ironically, the 1982 regulations on "DOD Cooperation With
Civilian Law Enforcement Officials" make no reference whatever
to House Joint Resolution 1292, even though they catalogue at
extraordinary length all the statutory and purported extra-statu-
tory exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act prohibition. Among
the statutory authorizations claimed by the new regulations to
constitute exceptions to that prohibition, however, is 18 U.S.C.
section 3056,08 the statute cited in House Joint Resolution 1292
as describing the protective duties of the Secret Service. 18
U.S.C. section 3056, however, makes no reference whatever to
use of any military resources. Whether by virtue of that section
itself or House Joint Resolution 1292, therefore, the assertion of
authority to employ any military resources to aid in Secret Ser-
vice protective duties is utterly without foundation in law, and is
a naked affront to the will of Congress declared in the Posse
Comitatus Act.209
206. See supra text accompanying note 204.
207. Nevertheless Mr. Justice Rehnquist, while he was an Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, did advise the Army General Counsel that the Resolution could be regarded as an
express exception to the Posse Comitatus Act prohibition. Unpublished Memorandum
from Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist to Hon. Robert F. Jordan III,
General Counsel, Department of the Army (Nov. 12, 1968) (copy on file at United States
Department of Justice).
208. 32 C.F.R. § 213.10(a)(2)(iv)(E) (1981).
209. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1976) contains criminal provisions regarding assassina-
tion, kidnapping, and assault against the President and those in line of presidential suc-
cession. Subsection (i) provides that violations of the section "shall be investigated by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation," and then adds that "[Aissistance may be requested
from any Federal . . . agency, including the Army, Navy, and Air Force, any statute,
rule, or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding." On its face, however, this provision
authorizes such aid of the military only with respect to investigation, and not with
respect to any other enforcement activities. This is confirmed by S. REP. No. 498, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 2866, 2867, which
declares that the purpose of the provision "is to make clear that the Federal Bureau of
1983]
64 University of Puget Sound Law Review
V. THE BLUEPRINT FOR INTERVENTION: COMMAND AND CONTROL
UNDER THE NEW CIVIL DISTURBANCE REGULATIONS
The Civil Disturbance Regulations designate the Secretary
of the Army (or the Under Secretary of the Army, as his desig-
nee) as "Executive Agent for the Department of Defense in all
matters pertaining to the planning for, and the deployment and
employment of military resources in the event of civil distur-
bances."210 The Regulations call for this "Executive Agent" to
establish a "Civil Disturbance Steering Committee," chaired by
the Undersecretary of the Army, "to provide advice and assis-
tance" to the "Executive Agent" "concerning civil disturbance
matters. 2 11 The members of this "Steering Committee" include
the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, several other uniformed
officers, some Defense Department officials, and the Deputy
Attorney General of the United States.2 12
The "Steering Committee," however, does not exercise oper-
ational control. The Regulations call for the "Executive Agent"
to establish "[a] Directorate of Military Support . ..with a
joint service staff under the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. 2 13 With
a Director drawn from the Army and a Deputy Director drawn
from the Air Force, the Directorate of Military Support is to
"plan, coordinate, and direct civil disturbance operations. 2 1 '
Investigation shall have jurisdiction over the investigation of violations of this act, and in
the investigation of such violations may avail itself of the assistance of ... the Army,
the Navy, and the Air Force .... " (emphasis added).
Title 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1976) is an equivalent provision enacted five years later, appli-
cable to assassination, kidnapping, and assault against members and members-elect of
Congress. This section originated as a Senate floor amendment to the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1970, and because it originated on the floor, is not illumi-
nated by any committee reports; see CoNF. REP. No. 91-1768, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 5842, 5849. The wording of 18 U.S.C. § 351(g) is identical to
the wording of 18 U.S.C. § 1751(i) (1976), after which it was patterned, and like the
latter, manifestly contemplates the assistance of the military only with respect to inves-
tigation, and not with respect to any other enforcement activities.
210. 32 C.F.R. § 215.6(a) (1981).
211. 32 C.F.R. § 215.8(a) (1981).
212. Id. The Committee members are: Deputy Attorney General of the United
States; Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs); General Counsel of the Department of Defense; Under Secretary of the
Navy; Under Secretary of the Air Force; Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Vice Chief of
Staff of the Air Force; Vice Chief of Naval Operations; Assistant Commandant of the
Marine Corps; Representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Under Secretary of
the Army as Chairman.
213. 32 C.F.R. § 215.8(b) (1981).
214. Id.
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The Regulations further provide that, with regard to distur-
bances within the continental United States, the "Executive
Agent is delegated the authority to exercise, through the Chief
of Staff, U.S. Army, the direction of those forces assigned or
committed to him by the military departments. '"21 5 Under the
Army Chief of Staff, "[a]t objective areas, designated task force
commanders will exercise operational control over all military
forces assigned for employment in the event of civil distur-
bances. s2 1  It is through these "designated military com-
manders," responsible to the Army Chief of Staff and his Direc-
torate of Military Support, that the "Executive Agent" exercises
"the direction of military resources committed or assigned for
employment in the event of actual or potential civil
disturbances. 21 7
What is contemplated, in other words, as to actual or poten-
tial disturbances, is a military chain of command from the Army
Chief of Staff (or Vice Chief of Staff) through the Directorate of
Military Support to the task force commanders and their troops,
the only point of civilian control" 8 being at the top where the
Secretary or Undersecretary of the Army acts as "Executive
Agent" for the Department of Defense.21 9
According to the Regulations, the employment of military
resources for controlling civil disturbances will "normally be
predicated upon the issuance of a Presidential Executive order
or Presidential directive authorizing and directing the Secretary
of Defense to provide for the restoration of law and order in a
specific State or locality. 22 0 Indeed, apart from the Regulations,
the statutes require that a Proclamation be issued by the Presi-
dent as a precondition to the use of troops under 10 U.S.C. sec-
215. 32 C.F.R. § 215.8(a)(2) (1981).
216. 32 C.F.R. § 215.7(c) (1981).
217. 32 C.F.R. § 215.6(a)(6) (1981) (emphasis added).
218. 32 C.F.R. § 215.5(e) (1981) provides that:
DOD components and their subordinated activities will coordinate with local
civil authorities or local military commanders as appropriate, to assure mutual
understanding of the policies and procedures to be adhered to in an actual or
anticipated civil disturbance situation.
This coordination, however, in no way implies that the local authorities are to have any
control over the federal military troops.
219. 32 C.F.R. § 215.9 (1981) deals with loans of federal military personnel and
equipment to states, and precludes the use of any personnel so "loaned" in any "direct
law enforcement role." Such "loaning" to states is beyond the subject of this article.
220. 32 C.F.R. § 215.5(a) (1981).
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tions 331, 332, or 333.221 The Regulations, however, provide for a
major exception to this requirement of presidential involvement:
No Presidential order or directive is needed, according to the
Regulations, for instances within the purported "emergency
authority," to deal with "[c]ases of sudden and unexpected
emergencies . ..which require that immediate military action
be taken.'2 2 In such instances, no civilian higher than the
"Executive Agent," the Secretary or Under Secretary of the
Army, need be involved in the decision. Moreover, since the
operational command role resides in the Army Chief of Staff and
his Directorate of Military Support, even this minimal civilian
role might well be more ephemeral than real.2 2 In other words,
the "emergency authority" justification for military intervention,
which is the most extraordinary and far-reaching power asserted
by the new Civil Disturbance Regulations, may be invoked and
implemented by the military itself with only a modicum (if even
that) of civilian involvement.
Nor is this all. As the requirement of a Presidential order or
directive is dispensed with, so also is the accompanying require-
ment that a "specific State or locality" be designated.22 More-
over, all of this pertains not only to "actual," but also to "poten-
tial" sudden emergencies requiring immediate military action.
22 5
Although perhaps restricted somewhat by the terms of a Depart-
ment of Defense Directive which is not available to the public,
the Directorate of Military Support under the "Executive
Agent" performs intelligence functions pertaining to planning in
readiness for such actual civil disturbances as might sometime
occur. 21 Furthermore, the Regulations contemplate that, short
of active military engagement, military ground forces may be
"prepositioned" and held at the ready in case disturbances
221. 10 U.S.C. § 334 (1976). While. they reject this author's thesis that the use of
military force for law enforcement violates the "due process of law" guarantee of the
fifth amendment, even Pye & Lowell, supra note 14, at 1094, urge that "The President
should be required to issue an executive order whenever troops are utilized, stating the
reasons for their deployment and the authority for his action." See also id. at 620 n.103.
222. 32 C.F.R. § 215.5(a)(1) (1981).
223. It will be recalled that General Grant rather than the President was effectively
put in command of the whole military reconstruction enterprise in the South after the
Civil War, by the Act of Congress requiring that all orders pertaining to reconstruction
measures be issued through him. See supra text accompanying notes 107-12.
224. 10 U.S.C. § 334 (1976).
225. 32 C.F.R. § 215.6(a)(6) (1981), quoted supra in text accompanying note 217.
226. 32 C.F.R. §§ 215.6(a)(8), 215.6(a)(13) (1981).
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should arise.2 2
Requests for prepositioning are to be made through the
Attorney General, and units larger than batallion size are not to
be prepositioned without presidential approval.2 8 Any units up
to and including a batallion in size, however, may be preposi-
tioned even without presidential approval, whenever a
need-even a potential need-might be perceived. The provi-
sions concerning prepositioning represent a particular danger.
However efficient prepositioning might seem as a means of facil-
itating prompt suppression of such disorders as might occur, it is
also true that the prepositioning of troops can intimidate citi-
zens and chill the exercise of constitutional rights. It should be
recalled that President Grant's arguments in support of preposi-
tioning2 9 were unpersuasive to the Congress in 1877 and 1878,
and that Congress enacted the Posse Comitatus Act in large part
because of the intimidation the congressmen believed voters had
felt because of soldiers prepositioned to prevent potential disor-
der at the polls.2 30
The alarming import of the Civil Disturbance Regulations
should now be quite apparent, even without any imaginative
conjuring of "worst case" scenarios in which an actual military
takeover might be conceived. The constitutional rule of due pro-
cess prohibits any domestic application of military force except
in situations of actual insurrection, where assaults specifically
against the established institutions of civilian government have
accomplished their goal of incapacitating those civilian institu-
tions.23 1 Even though the statutory changes accomplished by
Congress during the Civil War and Reconstruction Eras compro-
mised that constitutional principle significantly, at least Con-
gress by the Posse Comitatus Act in 1878 had required strict
compliance with those amended statutes, which still require per-
sonal involvement of the President in every event. That 1878
legislation was, above all, a repudiation of the notion that any-
one, even the President himself, could claim any inherent
227. 32 C.F.R. § 215.6(a)(6) (1981).
228. 32 C.F.R. § 215.5(g) (1981).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 156-57. Grant had explained: "The station-
ing of a company or part of a company in the vicinity, where they would be available to
prevent riot, has been the only use made of troops prior to and at the time of the elec-
tions." G. L=_R, supra note 152, at 6-7.
230. 7 CONG. REc. 3851, 3852 (1878).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 15-44; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
2, 127 (1866).
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authority to make domestic use of military force, no matter what
emergency might be claimed. In the face of all this, the Civil
Disturbance Regulations now assert broad extra-statutory
authority for the discretionary use of federal troops, not only to
protect federal property and functions, but also to deal with any
perceived actual or potential "emergency." Such an emergency,
the Regulations contemplate, might arise in the event of "calam-
ities," an undefined term; or in the event of "disasters," another
undefined term; or in the event of "civil disturbances," defined
to include not only "group acts of violence" (whether or not
directed at established civilian institutions of government) but
also "disorders prejudicial to public law and order. '" The judg-
ment that such an emergency has arisen, or that there is poten-
tial that it might arise, need not be made by the President; at
most a Secretary or Under Secretary of the Army might be
involved, and in any event operational control will be in military
hands. Moreover, even when there is no actual deployment of
troops, an established Pentagon machinery of intelligence and
planning is constantly in operation, watching for occasions for
intervention to arise, always prepared to preposition troops or to
take such other actions as might be deemed expedient.
VI. YET ANOTHER FAULTY FOUNDATION FOR MILITARY
INTERVENTION
To many American Indians, the tiny village of Wounded
Knee on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota has
peculiar historic and symbolic significance. It was at that site in
the year 1890, when the area was still a frontier, that federal
troops of the Seventh Cavalry killed at least two hundred Sioux
women, children, and men in what official annals denominate a
"battle" but many Indians remember as a "massacre" represen-
tative of the decades of Indian wars precipitated by the white
man's westward expansion. In February 1973, this little hamlet
at the crossing of two roads in a quiet valley surrounded by low
hills, composed of a few churches, a trading post, an Indian
museum, a gas station, and a number of small residences scat-
tered across three square miles, was home to about seventeen
families, most of whom were Oglala Sioux. A white family ran
the trading post.
232. 32 C.F.R. §§ 215.3(a), 215.4(c)(1)(i) (1981).
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There had been a few demonstrations and some violent inci-
dents elsewhere on the Pine Ridge and nearby Rosebud Reser-
vations during the preceding few months, in which organizers
and members of the activist "American Indian Movement"
(AIM) had been involved. A select force of United States mar-
shals, called the "Special Operations Group," first organized in
1971, had been sent to the area to enforce law and order; but by
February 26 most of the marshals had been sent home. They
would soon be recalled.
On the afternoon of February 27, 1973, between two and
three hundred members and supporters of AIM assembled near
the community of Pine Ridge. As evening arrived, they formed a
car caravan and drove to Wounded Knee. Some of them were
armed with rifles, pistols, knives, or clubs. When they arrived at
Wounded Knee, there was a brandishing of weapons, much
clamour, and some shooting into the air; the visitors, welcomed
by some but not by all of the residents, reportedly took eleven
white residents "hostage" and declared themselves in control of
the village. Looting of the trading post and some of the other
buildings was reported. About 8:30 in the evening, news of the
Wounded Knee situation reached the Bureau of Indian Affairs
Office in Pine Ridge, and federal authorities then set up road-
blocks with passenger vehicles manned by marshals and agents
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to prevent further
entry into the Wounded Knee area. This began a siege that was
to last seventy-one days.
The Wounded Knee incident was highly publicized, and
provided opportunity for AIM to focus widespread attention
upon the demands of that activist organization seeking to
advance certain causes pertaining to American Indians. Public-
ity was in fact the purpose of the Wounded Knee occupation,
and not destruction or riot, although actions such as the
reported looting and the reported seizure of hostages were
plainly unlawful. Because of the reports of unlawful acts, the
event appropriately was of significant law enforcement concern.
The level of concern it actually received, however, was distinctly
out of proportion to the scale of the alleged violations of law.
Beginning the morning after the takeover with a series of meet-
ings between the United States Attorney General, the Deputy
Attorney General, the Associate Deputy Attorney General, and
others in Washington, D.C., Wounded Knee preoccupied the
attentions of several principal officials in the national adminis-
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tration for more than two months. Although the hostages had
been declared free to leave on March 1, the second full day of
the occupation, and although all of them had in fact left by
March 7 or 8, the occupiers had dug trenches and prepared
themselves to continue the occupation until assured of immedi-
ate congressional investigations into claimed violations of Indian
treaties and into the conditions on Sioux reservations. These
demands not being met, the occupiers remained for a ten week
long stand-off punctuated with periodic exchanges of gunfire,
covered by television crews and reporters making the occupation
a major media event.
Most of the details of the Wounded Knee occupation and
siege are beyond the scope of this article. The least known,
because scarcely publicized, feature of the Wounded Knee inci-
dent, however, was the novel and extraordinary use that the gov-
ernment made of federal military resources in maintaining the
siege. Although armored personnel carriers had visibly replaced
civilian vehicles at the roadblocks after about two weeks, no uni-
formed military personnel were observed. It was not until many
months later, during criminal prosecutions of some of those who
had participated in the occupation, and as a result of court
orders compelling resisted government disclosure to defense
counsel of voluminous documentary records,2 33 that the full
scope of military involvement in the siege of Wounded Knee
became known; and even then, there was almost no public atten-
tion drawn to the facts.
The Directorate of Military Support at the Pentagon had
been involved from the first day of the siege; the use by the fed-
eral marshals and FBI agents of Army flares and other equip-
ment was first approved on February 28. On March 2, the Chief
of Staff of the 82nd Airborne Division was dispatched to
Wounded Knee as a Department of Defense "observer," and a
brigade of the 82nd Airborne was placed on alert for possible
deployment there. The next day an Army Colonel was deployed
to Pine Ridge to coordinate logistics for the operation. On
March 4, the Commander of the 18th Airborne Corps prepared
for the Directorate of Military Support a memorandum entitled
"Concept of Federal Military Support of Wounded Knee Opera-
233. These Defense and Justice Department internal memoranda and reports are on
file with the author at the University of Puget Sound School of Law, Tacoma,
Washington.
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tions." Significantly, this memorandum observed that:
[b]ecause of its isolated geographical location, the seizure and
holding of Wounded Knee poses no threat to the Nation, the
State of South Dakota or the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation
itself. However, it is conceded that this act is a source of irrita-
tion if not embarrassment to the Administration in general and
the Department of Justice in particular.
More military equipment was soon authorized for use; and on
March 8 the Directorate of Military Support provided to the
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Alexander Haig, an
assessment of a request made by the Attorney General for fed-
eral military troops to establish a twenty-five mile perimeter
around Wounded Knee. The Directorate's March 8 "operational
concept for operations at Wounded Knee" contemplated the use
of a force of 1,000 troops from the 82nd Airborne Division. Five
days later the Directorate completed a memorandum discussing
three separate optional plans for the use of federal troops to end
the occupation. These proposals were reviewed by, commented
upon, and approved by General Haig, Army Chief of Staff
Abrams and others.
While none of those extreme plans for military action was
actually carried out, the Chief of Staff of the 82nd Airborne, who
had helped draw up those plans after having been dispatched to
Wounded Knee, remained on the scene exercising an equal voice
in strategic and tactical decision making with the chief FBI and
Marshals' Service officials there. Logistics functions also contin-
ued to be performed by regular military officers throughout the
period of the siege. Aerial visual and photographic reconnais-
sance missions were repeatedly flown in Air Force planes, by
crew members some of whom were regular Air Force officers and
others of whom were members of the Air Force National Guard
of the United States placed on active federal duty for the pur-
pose. Ground support for the air sorties, support for the civilian
personnel on the ground, instruction and maintenance regarding
the military vehicles and other equipment being used, and other
functions were performed by Army and Air Force military per-
sonnel on active federal duty, although they wore civilian
clothes. While those who actually manned the barricades were
civilian marshals and FBI agents, they used Army M-16, M-1,
and M1-D1 rifles, grenade launchers, armored personnel carriers,
jeeps, searchlights, and other military equipment. Regular Air
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Force aircraft and crews were used to carry Justice Department
personnel as well as military officers back and forth between the
nation's capital and the remote scene of the siege. In April, a
force of regular Army troops was prepositioned at Fort Carson,
Colorado, and held for a time on six-hour alert for possible
deployment to Wounded Knee. When the episode was over and
an accounting was made, it was determined that a variety of
Army and Air Force trucks and sedans, with their regular mili-
tary drivers, in addition to the armored personnel carriers and
jeeps, had been used to maintain and support the siege, as well
as 177 military rifles, almost 190,000 rounds of military ammuni-
tion, more than 23,000 flares, a dozen grenade launchers, and
hundreds of tear gas grenades, mine detectors, helmets, radios,
field telephones, protective vests, and a variety of other military
items ranging from tents, folding cots, and stoves, to parkas,
ponchos, and canteens.
The Wounded Knee occupation was indeed an occasion for
diligent and deliberate law enforcement. More than that, the
highly publicized episode was indeed "a source of irritation if
not embarrassment" to the law-and-order Nixon administration,
as the above-quoted memorandum to the Directorate of Military
Support had pointed out. But it was by no stretch of the imagi-
nation an "insurrection"; nor was it even a "riot" or "civil dis-
turbance." None of the several statutory or extra-statutory bases
claimed by the new Civil Disturbance Regulations, then just one
year old, as legal justification for involving the Directorate of
Military Support or any military resources in aid of law enforce-
ment was, or ever has been pretended to have been, present at
Wounded Knee. No law then in force authorized the use even of
military equipment, much less of military personnel, in aid of
such activities of law enforcement officials. Yet for ten weeks
Army Vice Chief of Staff Haig, the Directorate, and the military
officers participating at the scene were actively involved in
designing and adapting plans, advising, coordinating, supervis-
ing, and otherwise helping-with military personnel as well as
other military resources-to execute this remarkable law
enforcement enterprise. By virtue of what heretofore unheard-of
authority could they have become so involved?
234
234. For an enlightening critical assessment of the use of military resources at
Wounded Knee, written by a Judge Advocate in the U.S. Marine Corps, see Meeks, Ille-
gal Law Enforcement: Aiding Civil Authorities in Violation of the Posse Comitatus Act,
70 MIL. L. REv. 83 (Dept. of Army Pamphlet 27-100-70, 1975).
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As if the broad new assertions of inherent executive prerog-
ative made in the Civil Disturbance Regulations promulgated
just twelve months earlier were not enough to remove all
restraints on the discretionary use of the military for law
enforcement, for this occasion the legal staffs of the Department
of the Army and the Department of Defense announced yet
another foundation for military intervention in civilian affairs.
Acknowledging that the events at Wounded Knee could not
accurately be regarded as constituting a "civil disturbance" so as
to come within the scope of the Civil Disturbance Regulations,
they decided (with the concurrence of the Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, later appointed a federal court of appeals judge) that what
was desired could be done under the guise of an obscure piece of
legislation called the "Economy Act."
To anyone other than one desperate to find colorable sup-
port for something he is resolved in any event to do, the Econ-
omy Act seems plainly unsuited to such an application. It had
never been put forward as support for any military involvement
in law enforcement. It is doubtful that such a possibility had
ever previously been conceived, by its draftsmen or anyone else.
In fact, established administrative construction of the Economy
Act plainly indicated that it could not validly be put to such use.
The Economy Act provides:
Any executive department or independent establishment
of the Government, or any bureau or office thereof, if funds are
available therefor and if it is determined by the head of such
executive department, establishment, bureau, or office to be in
the interest of the Government so to do, may place orders with
any other such department, establishment, bureau, or office for
materials, supplies, equipment, work, or services of any kind
that such requisitioned Federal agency may be in a position to
supply or equipped to render, and shall pay promptly by check
to such Federal agency as may be requisitioned, upon its writ-
ten request, either in advance or upon the furnishing or per-
formance thereof, all or part of the estimated or actual cost
thereof as determined by such department, establishment,
bureau, or office as may be requisitioned; but proper adjust-
ments on the basis of the actual cost of the materials, supplies,
or equipment furnished, or work or services performed, paid
for in advance, shall be made as may be agreed upon by the
departments, establishments, bureaus, or offices concerned:
... Provided further, That if such work or services can be
conveniently or more cheaply performed by private agencies
19831
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such work shall be let by competitive bids to such private
agencies. "
On its face, and as its name implies, the Economy Act aims at
efficiency in government by making possible inter-agency trans-
fer of supplies and services of the kind that might otherwise be
procured from entities outside of government. Since it deals
with the allocation of appropriated fiscal resources, the adminis-
tration of the Act is overseen by the Comptroller General of the
United States, who in written opinions has consistently con-
strued it as giving the service-rendering agency no authority
which it does not already have independently of the Act,2"6 and
as applying only where the service to be performed "is a normal
function of both the procuring and performing agency" 8 7 inde-
pendently of the Economy Act itself."8 Since none of the
grounds for use of the military relied upon by the Civil Distur-
bance Regulations is even pretended to have been present at
Wounded Knee, and since the Posse Comitatus Act categorically
prohibits the use of any part of the Army or Air Force in law
enforcement "except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress,' 289 it is
hardly possible to maintain that law enforcement is a "normal
function" of the military departments or within their authority
independently of the Economy Act itself.
Furthermore, even if its consistent administrative construc-
tion could be ignored, the Economy Act could not be viewed as
an Act of Congress "expressly" providing a further exception to
the prohibition of the Posse Comitatus Act. The Economy Act
does not expressly refer to distinctively military resources,
whether personnel or military materiel; it makes no reference
whatever to efforts to "execute the laws;" and it certainly does
not specify "expressly" any "cases" or "circumstances" in which
law enforcement use of military resources may be made.
There was simultaneously pending in a federal court a case
challenging the use of a handful of enlisted servicemen as under-
235. 31 U.S.C. § 686(a) (1976).
236. 18 Comp. Gen. 262, at 266 (1938); 23 Comp. Gen. 935, at 937-38 (1944).
237. 32 Comp. Gen. 392, 394 (1953).
238. The Comptroller General also has pointed out that use of the Economy Act
requires a written agreement between the agencies to be made in advance, 13 Comp.
Gen. 234, 237 (1934). No such advance agreement was made with respect to Wounded
Knee.
239. See supra note 158.
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cover investigators by the Treasury Department; but it never
occurred to the government lawyers handling that case to make
the assertion that the Economy Act applied, even though if that
Act could justify what was done at Wounded Knee it a fortiori
would have prevented the judicial condemnation of the rela-
tively petty utilization involved in that case. 40 Only in connec-
tion with the extraordinary military involvement in the
Wounded Knee adventure has this fanciful interpretation of the
Economy Act been advanced.2" Ten years later, the Justice
240. See United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1974).
241. Individuals accused of participating in the occupation of Wounded Knee were
prosecuted for interfering with law enforcement officials "lawfully engaged in the lawful
performance" of their official duties, 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) (1976). In several different
cases, the prosecuted individuals defended in part on the ground that the law enforce-
ment officials were not "lawfully" engaged in the "lawful" performance of duty, for the
reason that their use of the military rendered their acts unlawful. The government
responded in each case by relying upon the Economy Act as making the use of the mili-
tary lawful.
In the first case to reach the issue, Chief Judge Nichol flatly rejected the govern-
ment's Economy Act argument. United States v. Banks, 383 F. Supp. 368 (D.S.D. 1974).
In the next case Judge Urbom, while asserting in unsupported dictum that the
Economy Act made the use of military materiel (as distinguished from personnel) per-
missible, acquitted the defendants on the ground that, on the evidence of involvement of
military personnel, "there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the law enforcement
officers were 'lawfully engaged in the lawful performance of their official duties.' " United
States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1381 (D. Neb. 1974). The government's attempt
to appeal from the judgment of acquittal was dismissed without any mention of the
Economy Act dictum regarding materiel. United States v. Jaramillo, 510 F.2d 808 (8th
Cir. 1975).
Government counsel next put their Economy Act argument to Judge (now Chief
Judge) Bogue. After displaying a hostility to the defendants which eventually led to his
removal from the case, Bogue without supporting rationale endorsed the government's
interpretation of the Economy Act in a ruling on a motion in limine, an opinion which he
submitted for official publication (United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916
(D.S.D. 1975)) even though it had no effect whatever on the case; the case was reassigned
to a different judge and the parties stipulated to admission of the evidence which
Bogue's in limine order had sought to exclude.
Finally, government counsel put their Economy Act argument to Judge VanSickle,
in United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186 (D.N.D. 1975). Judge VanSickle in dicta
endorsed the government's Economy Act contention, although without any reasoned
attempt to reconcile it with the terms or policy of the Posse Comitatus Act. The opera-
tive part of VanSickle's opinion indicated that while he seemed willing to concede that
the evidence might be taken to show that some of the civil law enforcement officials had
made unlawful use of the military (notwithstanding the purported force of the Economy
Act), he could not conclude that all of the officials interfered with by defendants had
done so. Thus, he found that while the evidence of Army or Air Force use was relevant to
the issue of "lawful performance," he also found "that it was not material enough to
taint the presumption that 'one or more' law enforcement officers were acting in per-
formance of their duties." Id. at 195.
The defendants before Judge VanSickle were convicted, and they appealed, sub
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Department is still maintaining, in civil litigation arising out of
the Wounded Knee events,"' this preposterous pretext that the
Economy Act legitimated the use made of the military at
Wounded Knee. The former Nixon administration officials who
are the defendants in that civil litigation have never asserted
that there was any other even colorable legal authority on which
they could rely.
VII. CONCLUSION
Good soldiers are patriots. They are worthy of gratitude and
praise. They are instruments, however, of war. Riot is not war,
nor is civil disorder or even violent disobedience to law. Insur-
rection, or rebellion, is a case apart, where violence directed at
government overthrow has, at least temporarily, attained its
goal. The traditional test is whether the courts have been
closed."3 Insurrection, unlike riot, is war.
nom. United States v. Casper, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970
(1977). Not a word about the Economy Act appears in the court of appeals opinion; the
convictions were affirmed on VanSickle's ground that the presumption of lawful per-
formance by at least "one or more" of the civilian officers interfered with had not been
overcome on the record. The only reference to the Economy Act issue was Circuit Judge
Heaney's observation in his separate opinion that the Economy Act issue should be left
"to another day." 541 F.2d at 1281.
Thus, no appellate court has ever countenanced the government's remarkably novel
construction of the Economy Act, and no district court has done so except in immaterial
dicta in the cases arising out of Wounded Knee.
Judges Urbom, Bogue, and VanSickle also each tendered their own different and
peculiar interpretation of the Posse Comitatus Act, each of those three different inter-
pretations being at odds with the'interpretation thoughtfully reached and applied by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372 (4th Cir.
1974); see also Wrynn v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1961). Judge Bogue's
futile ruling was ignored at trial. Judge Urbom acquitted his defendants notwithstanding
his Posse Comitatus Act construction, and the government's appeal was dismissed. Judge
VanSickle's interpretation was immaterial on the view he and the court of appeals took
of the case, and the court of appeals did not address it at all.
242. Lamont v. Haig, Civil Action No. 81-5048, pending in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of South Dakota. The case was first filed in February, 1975, in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, as Civil Action No. 75-271.
A venue dismissal there was followed by a successful appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 590 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The case was
reinstated on the docket of the District Court for the District of Columbia, but proceed-
ings were then stayed by order of that court. On February 26, 1981, that court trans-
ferred the case to the District of South Dakota pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). After a
motions ruling on May 24, 1982, Civ. A. No. 81-5048 (see 539 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.D.
1982)), a second Amended Complaint was filed, served and answered. The case remains
pending on the date of completion of this article.
243. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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Events of constitutional dimension in England prior to the
mid-eighteenth century had marked this distinction with
repeated insistence. The early American statesmen, outraged at
the military law enforcement which their tradition decried as
unlawful, cited it as a cause for revolution. They would not have
their own government repeat the offense; thus they constitution-
alized in the fifth amendment the traditional English prohibi-
tion against military intervention, by providing that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by "due pro-
cess of law." Congress, when it first came to legislate with regard
to the military, carefully respected and implemented that rule.
Seventy years later, a generation of Radicals ravished due
process to attain their immediate moral and political goals.
When reason and a sense of restraint were restored, Congress
sought to curtail military intervention by enacting the Posse
Comitatus Act. That enactment, however, did not destroy the
foundations for such intervention which the Civil War and
Reconstruction Congresses themselves had laid. Neither has it
proved effective to prevent new foundations from being laid
more recently by the executive branch.
We have not for a century experienced quite such egregious
military interventions, although numerous more limited
instances of military law enforcement have occurred. So long as
the victims of such military intervention are relatively few and
unpopular, and public support for suppression is strong, such
affronts to due process can be survived. But they can be neither
forgotten nor excused; the English suffered Tudor and Stuart
lieutenancy and commissions for three generations before they
took Charles's head. When dissatisfaction becomes widespread,
resort to the military expedient serves to kindle rather than
quench the fire.24" Toleration of military intervention in any law
244. The use of Redcoats in Boston and elsewhere helped inflame the restless Amer-
ican colonists to revolution.
General Halleck, in an 1870 report quoted in 7 CONG. REC. 3849 (1878), observed:
I have been assured by Federal civil officers that the use of troops in executing
judicial process and enforcing the revenue and other civil laws seemed to
increase rather than diminish the necessity of resorting to such force in civil
matters. The ill-disposed become more and more exasperated at being coerced
by a force which they think has been unconstitutionally employed against
them, and the better disposed relax their efforts to punish local crimes, on the
plea that this duty now devolves on the military.
When state National Guard troops appeared on the campus of Kent State Univer-
sity in 1970, what had been a diffuse series of events reacting to the American invasion
of Cambodia became a concentrated and focused protest against military control of that
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enforcement circumstance ultimately portends the sort of mili-
tary oppression we observe and lament in other countries today.
The promise of "due process" is empty rhetoric unless those
with the requisite authority enforce obedience to what it entails.
The judiciary can vindicate the law only in retrospect, as cases
are made; and what is needed is the prevention of military inter-
vention, not retrospective redress of its harm. The executive
branch, in planning for future exigencies, tends to deprecate and
minimize every attempted restraint on its choice of force, and to
exploit every pretext to keep available the option of military
means. Military officers and executive officials, when a crisis is
perceived, will not parse statutes and probe legislative history,
or ponder over judicial precedents; their actions will be con-
strained (if at all) only by their own regulations. If unlawful mil-
itary intervention is to be prevented, therefore, Congress must
be diligent to ensure that those regulations are made to conform
to the law.
Consequently, there must be members and committees in
Congress willing to make it their business, during periods of
quiet when the prospect of crisis seems far away, boldly and per-
sistently to inquire into the relevant regulations of the executive
branch, and to insist that those regulations and the executive
plans that are made for emergencies conform to the Congress's
will. Otherwise, unlawful military intervention will not be
deterred.
There must also be determination in Congress to reconsider
and revise those few existing statutes which, by virtue of Recon-
struction Era excesses and distortions, purport to authorize what
the Constitution forbids.2" 5
But there is more that Congress must do. The executive
branch, although willful, is not usually willfully pernicious. It
resorts to military expedients because those are the most effec-
tive at hand for dealing with exigencies that the executive will
not, and should not, ignore. Equally effective civilian expedients
for every domestic law enforcement exigency can be provided;
some possibilities have been suggested above in footnote 163.
Congressional action is needed, however, to make such civilian
alternatives available. Prohibitions against the military expedi-
campus, raising tensions on both sides and producing notorious tragic results.
245. E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 332, discussed supra in text accompanying notes 91-98; 10
U.S.C. § 333, discussed supra in text accompanying notes 99-130; and several of the
statutes discussed supra in note 188.
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ent, regardless how insistently maintained, cannot be expected
to be effective in preventing military intervention unless ade-
quate civilian alternatives are provided.
With Congress, therefore, rests the question whether this
article might serve to inspire a revival of faith in, and faithful-
ness to, due process, or will merely document its demise.
